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ABSTRACT
Cato Sells became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1913 
after a successful law career in Iowa, and a prosperous 
banking business in Texas. Always ambitious and hardworking, 
he climbed the political ladder of the Democratic Party 
during the late nineteenth century and received the position 
of Commissioner of Indian Affairs as a payoff in the Woodrow 
Wilson administration. While commissioner from 1913 to 1921, 
he addressed a wide range of issues, and these, in turn, 
attracted a varied response from Native Americans, white 
reform groups, and government officials. Throughout his 
difficult tenure in office, Sells found himself constantly on 
the defensive as he tried to balance the demands of opposing 
constituencies and to upgrade the performance of an often 
lethargic bureaucracy.
Land policy dominated much of Sells 1 official attention 
precisely because the release of restricted land under the 
1887 Dawes Severalty Act began just as he took office. He 
issued land patents quickly, especially after 1917, to make 
Indians self-sufficient, but this and other actions 
ultimately resulted in a tremendous loss of land.
Sells faced attacks from critics about the poor quality 
of his employees and about dissolving the Indian Bureau. He 
tried to correct some of the more severe violations while 
defending his own position, but failed to offer any wholesale 
change. In another attempt to make Indians self-sufficient,
iv
Sells implemented a new form of education for Native 
Americans that prepared them for specific jobs. Some Indian 
groups opposed this change calling it discriminatory because 
it kept Indians in a cycle of dependency.
Tuberculosis and trachoma ravaged Indian populations 
well before Sells took office. He took steps, especially in 
schools, to reduce the spread of these diseases. Alcohol and 
peyote became a special project for Sells. He advocated the 
elimination of both of these substances from the lives of 
Indians without considering the larger questions of personal 
and religious freedoms. As World War I approached, Sells 
called for fully integrated military units, despite some 
opposition. Sells favored citizenship for war veterans, but 
the commissioner did not endorse wholesale citizenship for 
all Native Americans.
Sells approached the Indian Bureau with high-minded 
ideals, but with little knowledge of Indians or the 
historical development of policy during that previous 
century. This political appointment did little to benefit 
the lot of Indians. Like so many who had preceded him into 
the office, Sells was a proven administrator and a true 
"progressive," but this combination did not meet the needs of 
hundreds of different Indian tribes spread across the United 
States.
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INTRODUCTION
The office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs has been 
riddled with controversy since its inception in 1824 as a 
specialized office within the Department of War, and beyond 
its transfer to the Interior Department in 1849. The general 
strategy of early commissioners was to keep Indians separate 
from white society, as was especially evident in the removal 
policy imposed on the Five Civilized Tribes. During the 
1820s and 1830s, these tribes were forced from their 
homelands in the southeastern United States and placed in the 
new Indian Territory that later became Oklahoma. By the mid­
nineteenth century, Indian policy shifted to assume a more 
paternalistic role as Native Americans were rapidly confined 
to specific reservations and treated as wards of the 
government.
Despite subtle differences in their approaches, each 
commissioner faced profound and far-reaching problems, not 
the least of which was to determine policy for hundreds of 
separate Indian nations within the United States. Some 
commissioners met the challenge with vigor and positive 
results, but most fell short of their stated goals and even 
created additional problems for Indians. Failure frequently 
resulted because the commissioner lacked a basic 
understanding of Indian customs, or because he had few 
administrative skills for simultaneously satisfying Congress,
1
2agents and outraged reformers. In numerous cases the office 
became a gift which successful politicians bestowed upon 
loyal supporters, thus leaving the fate of Indian matters in 
the hands of men unqualified for the job. Likewise, the 
nature of the agency system did not lend itself to efficient 
supervision because the main office was in Washington, D.C., 
while most of the Indians were confined to reservations west 
of the Mississippi River. This resulted in slow delivery of 
supplies and difficulty in defending Native Americans from 
white raiders.^
By the early part of the twentieth century, the 
prevailing philosophy was one of assimilation. The 
"Progressive Movement," led by many high-minded reformers, 
tried to correct the problems of American society by 
stressing a more active role for various levels of government 
in producing positive social change. Many of these reformers 
saw the vast majority of Indians as incapable of becoming a 
part of white society for now, mainly because of their lack 
of skills in financial matters. In such cases, progressives 
advocated guardianship until Indians became more accustomed 
to white culture and exhibited the ability to handle their 
own affairs. During much of the Progressive Era, this 
paternalistic philosophy dominated Indian policy.
In 1912, newly-elected President Woodrow Wilson 
appointed Franklin K. Lane as Secretary of the Interior to 
administer the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Wilson and Lane
3then chose Texas banker Cato Sells to fill the position of 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, The choice of Sells was not 
an easy one, but Wilson had to select someone free from the 
scandal that had plagued the office under predecessor Robert 
G. Valentine. Wilson rewarded Sells for his efforts in the 
national election in Texas, and simultaneously found someone 
who shared the same highly moralistic philosophy as the 
newly-elected president.2
Cato Sells was born on October 6, 1859, in Vinton, Iowa,
to Captain George Washington and Elizabeth Catherine Sells. 
Captain Sells practiced law and moved to LaPorte City, Iowa 
when his son was quite young. In 1873, the elder Sells died 
suddenly of a heart attack, leaving his wife and two sons. 
Hard pressed for family income, Cato Sells gained employment 
in a local hardware store owned by B. S. Stanton who took 
special interest in the boy and gave him an excellent 
training in business. Sells attributed much of his later 
success to the encouragement and guidance that he received 
from Stanton.3
In 1877, Sells entered Cornell College in Mount Vernon, 
Iowa, while his brother, Douglass, enrolled in Cornell's 
senior preparatory school. Their mother also moved to Mount 
Vernon and was employed for several years by the college as a 
house mother of the Cornell Boarding Association.^ Sells 
completed two years at Cornell College and returned to 
LaPorte City to study law under ex-judge C.A. Bishop. After
4two years of intense study, he passed the Iowa bar 
examination in 1B80 and began practicing law in LaPorte City. 
The local newspaper, The Progress Review, referred to Sells 
as "a deep thinker, a keen reasoner, an assiduous student, a 
close observer of men and events, and a brilliant orator."5
Sells ' political activity began at an early age and 
lasted throughout his entire life. While a student, he gave 
speeches for the Democratic Party which gained him the title 
Mboy orator."^ He served for two years as city recorder of 
LaPorte City, beginning in 1880, and quickly climbed the 
political ladder to mayor in 1882, at the age of twenty- 
three. His popularity remained strong enough that the 
citizens of LaPorte City called on him to seek another term 
as mayor, but Sells declined. Instead, he chose to become 
more active in state Democratic politics by serving on the 
state Democratic committee for a number of years. Despite 
his failure to win election in 1886 as Iowa's Secretary of 
State, the Democratic National Convention sent him to Indiana 
to campaign for local Democratic candidates because of his 
celebrated oratorical abilities.7
In 1889, Sells moved back to Vinton and was chosen by 
Governor Horace Boies to be a member of his staff. He served 
in this capacity until 1892, when he was called to fill 
former Lieutenant-Governor Joseph Dysart's seat on the board 
of trustees at the Iowa State College of Agricultural and 
Mechanical Arts. He served one term on this board and was
5nominated for another, but declined the opportunity. At the 
same time, Sells served two terms as the Benton County 
District Attorney, and The Progress Review praised him as the 
"most able and vigilant public prosecutor that county has 
ever k n o w n . A  year earlier, Sells had married Lola Abbott 
McDaniel, with whom he eventually had three children:
Dorothy, Donald, and Barbara.
In 1892, Sells was named the secretary of the Democratic 
National Convention, and the following year he became the 
chairman of the Iowa State Democratic Convention. A year 
later, Sells gained more national recognition when President 
Grover Cleveland named him United States District Attorney 
for the Northern District of Iowa. He served admirably in 
this position until 1898, and became known for his fierce 
prosecution of pension fraud cases involving Civil War 
veterans.9 Cornell College recognized his efforts as a 
prosecutor by conferring an honorary Master of Arts degree on 
him in that same year. Years later, he would receive 
honorary law degrees from his alma mater and Baylor 
University in Texas for his accomplishments as Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs. In 1898, he returned to Vinton and 
resumed his private law practice.
Nine years later, Sells moved to Cleburne, Texas and 
left behind a prosperous law practice in Iowa. As he later 
noted, he moved to "pursue his political career in the more 
congenial surroundings of C l e b u r n e . T h e r e  he established
6the Texas State Bank and Trust Company and became heavily 
involved in local Democratic politics. Three years later, he 
joined Texas' "Wilson for President" movement after Wilson 
had just been elected governor of New Jersey. Many notable 
Texas progressives such as Otis B. Holt, Thomas Watt Gregory, 
Albert S. Burleson and Thomas B. Love joined Wilson's 
campaign in Texas. Love forged ahead and called on Governor 
Wilson to seek the nomination of the Democratic Party for 
President of the United S t a t e s .
In Texas, though, a split existed in the Democratic 
party. The Progressives faced a formidable conservative 
opposition from Governor Oscar Branch Colquitt and the very 
influential Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey. To counter the 
growing threat to his nomination, Wilson travelled to Texas 
in 1911 and planned strategy with his supporters. At the 
Oriental Hotel in Dallas, Sells introduced Wilson as the man 
"whom we all hope will be the next President of the United 
S t a t e s . Although, the initial response to Wilson was not 
entirely favorable, his following continued to grow. He 
identified himself with the liberal tradition of Senator John 
Reagan, Governor James Hogg and Judge A. W. Terrell to build 
Texas support. Unfortunately in the larger arena of Texas 
politics, the continued endorsement of Wilson by the 
progressive Democrats produced a further split in the state's 
Democratic Party. On March 11, 1912, Sells established the
Wilson campaign headquarters at the Hotel Southland in
7Dallas. By this point, the diligent work of Sells, Love and 
Gregory propelled the Wilson organizations into nearly every 
county and town within the state. Their intention was to 
perfect party organization and to "bring out the vote," which 
they did very effectively.-*-^
Governor John Harman of Ohio ultimately won support in 
only two states for the 1912 nomination of the Democratic 
Party. Yet, conservative Democrats in Texas had thrown their 
support to Harman partially because of his ideals, but mostly 
to fight the Wilson nomination. They favored Harman's 
traditional ideas of conservative principles and not the 
"Socialistic heresies" of Wilson. The Harman campaign was 
loose in organization, but gaining support in traditionally 
conservative Texas. In the spring of 1912, however, the 
president of the Harman organization killed the campaign in 
Texas by declaring "that if the Democratic party adopted the 
principles of 'this so-called progressivism,' he [Harman] 
would turn Republican ."-*-5 By May, the Wilson supporters had 
gained control of the state Democratic Convention in Houston, 
and Sells was rewarded for his diligent work by his 
appointment to the national committee of the Democratic 
Party.^ Wilson went on to win the presidency in November of 
1912, and took office four months later.
In June of 1913, Sells was selected by the new Secretary 
of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and President Wilson to be 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. According to Matthew K.
Sniffen of the Indian Rights Association, the selection of 
Sells was influenced by members of this association. In 
1914, Sniffen thanked President Wilson and Secretary Lane for 
putting the "right man in the right place".17 Wilson wanted 
to place "a man of affairs, because he has millions to 
administer; a man of imagination, that he may have sympathy 
for the Indian; and, above all, a man with the fear of God in 
his heart."1® Here again, the moralistic attitude of the 
Wilson administration and the whole Progressive Era became 
apparent. Lane claimed that Sells was perfect for this 
position because "it would not be a job, but an 
opportunity."1®
Sells chose to take this position with a salary of 
$5,000 per year instead of a position with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission for a salary of $7,500 per year. The New 
Republic claimed that this position "had taken a grip upon 
his [Sells] heart and life that no offer of ease or increased 
salary could s h a k e . T h e  Review of Reviews insisted that 
this was not a reward for political support, but rather Sells 
was selected because he represented both "idealism and common 
sense in managing the Indian Office." Under the leadership 
of Lane, Sells would "encourage the evolution of Indians into 
full and self-directed citizenship."^i
Sells entered the office with the hope of providing 
strong new leadership that had been lacking under his 
predecessor, Robert G. Valentine.^2 He faced the challenge
9with excitement, despite the fact that he had little 
knowledge of Indians. Having entered the office with few 
preconceived notions, he viewed the office as a business 
proposition, to be run in an honest and efficient manner. He 
"inventoried" his "plant" of 6,000 employees and made a 
careful study of its far-flung c o m p o n e n t s S n i f f e n  praised 
the "genius" of Sells early on in his tenure, especially his 
ablility to resolve the factionalism of the Bureau and to 
bring the "house divided against itself" together. Because 
of the personal ambitions of former commissioners, the Bureau 
had become chaotic, and Sniffen claimed, the remaining 
employees were inspired by Sells' "magnetic personality" and 
e n t h u s i a s m .^ 4 During his eight years as commissioner, Sells 
faced many monumental problems in administering the Indian 
policy of Congress, and he approached the office with the 
same progressive zeal that was characteristic of his 
formative years in Iowa politics and characteristic of the 
overall Wilson administration. Early in his first year, he 
laid out his philosophy on Indian policy. He wanted "to 
bring about the speedy individualization of the Indian."25 
Among the numerous issues with which Sells dealt, the most 
pressing of his era were land and agriculture, Indian Bureau 
reform, educational services, health care, and the military 
service of Indians.
Sells' new individualization policy brought the land 
policy of the Bureau into question. When he took office in
10
1913, the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 and its twenty-five 
year protection period had just ended, leaving Sells to 
determine the competency and fate of numerous Indians. To 
speed the complicated process, competency commissions were 
established to survey the different levels of ability among 
Indians. Once a commission reported its findings, Sells 
decided whether or not each recommended Indian was ready to 
accept the responsibility of his allotment and other 
financial resources. Ultimately feeling great pressure from 
reformers seeking to have Indians handle their own affairs 
and persons looking for the chance to buy Indian land, Sells 
implemented a new policy. He released a large segment of the 
Indian population from ward status based almost entirely on 
the amount of Indian blood they possessed.26
This "new era" in land policy intensified the problems 
surrounding Indian rights to their land and resources.
Minors' estates in Oklahoma and agricultural rights in many 
western states became two of the major problems Sells faced. 
Many Oklahoma Indian minors lost much of their land because 
of unauthorized sale of their allotments by both government 
guardians and their own parents and relatives. This problem 
rapidly accelerated following the discovery of rich oil and 
coal deposits on Oklahoma lands. Likewise, on the more arid 
reservations of the West, Indian water rights came under 
attack from cattle and farming i n t e r e s t s . ^7
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These pressing problems came about because of poor 
policies initiated by Sells’ predecessors, and because local 
Indian Bureau officials failed to carry out the policy 
properly. The latter practice continued to plague Sells and 
the integrity of the Bureau, especially because it was 
difficult for Sells to oversee the more than 6,000 employees 
at such distant locations. Reform groups such as the Indian 
Rights Association and the Society of American Indians 
regularly protested the immoral behavior of many local 
employees whose actions ranged from personal gain on land 
sales to running prostitution rings of Indian girls.^8 
On the national level, legislation was proposed to 
reform the Bureau and even to dissolve it altogether. The 
Johnson Bill, proposed by Senator Edwin Johnson of South 
Dakota in 1916, advocated that each tribe have the right to 
select its own superintendents as decided by a majority vote 
of the male members of the tribe. Further legislation 
suggested the complete dissolution of the Bureau, which would 
have left Indians bereft of treaty protections and without 
any federal monies. This idea sounded extreme but the 
original intention of Secretary Lane and Commissioner Sells 
was to move Indians toward independence in order to dissolve 
the Bureau and save the government money. Yet, the radical 
wording of this proposal insured its legislative defeat, 
along with the Johnson Bill.
12
Education, under Commissioner Robert Valentine, had 
become an integral part of the proposed solution to Indian 
assimilation problems. Valentine's administration recorded a 
higher number of Indians in public schools than ever before, 
and by 1914, Sells declared that the number of Indians in 
public schools equalled that of Indians in government 
schools. Sells agreed with Valentine that educating Native 
Americans was an important step in freeing them from 
wardship. Once Indians had attained an education they could 
supposedly manage their own affairs. In response to this 
enrollment shift toward public schools, Sells began a program 
of reducing the number of government schools, so as to save 
money. He saw the establishment of white public schools on 
allotted land as a positive step toward the destruction of 
the reservation system and wardship in g e n e r a l . 29
In 1916, Sells adopted a new policy of moving education 
toward more vocational training so that Indians would be 
better prepared for jobs. Congress likewise implemented 
compulsory education as a part of its new program for Indian 
education. While trying to adhere to the congressional 
guidelines requiring school attendance, he set up special 
committees to hear Indian complaints on school reform. By 
the time he left office, Sells had abandoned these committees 
and accepted the congressional guidelines.30
Sells also made efforts to improve the lives of Indians 
through better health conditions. He received congressional
13
appropriations to build hospitals and to sponsor lectures on 
how to live a more healthy and sanitary life. However World 
War I interrupted these efforts just as the influenza 
outbreak of 1918 descended with a fury. This epidemic would 
ultimately claim over two percent of the total Indian 
population in the United States.31
Two other issues that Sells felt compelled to address 
during his tenure were alcohol and peyote use among Indians.
The sale and use of alcohol on reservations was illegal, but 
white distributors continued to make an impact. Sells vowed 
that he would not drink any alcohol while he was 
commissioner, and he claimed that the elimination of alcohol 
from the lives of Indians was a key step in their liberation.
As for the use of peyote, many reform groups petitioned Sells 
to make forceful strides to curb and even forbid its use. 
Despite Sells' efforts, peyote remained available because the 
contents of this drug could not be determined to violate any 
existing l a w . 32
The war in Europe intensified as Sells began his second 
term, and military service among Indians became a major issue, 
though it was not a new concept. Throughout American history 
Indians had played a significant role in the military, usually 
as scouts or guides for military units in unfamiliar areas.
Yet, in the 1890s, experimental Indian companies were organized 
to see whether or not Native Americans could become accustomed 
to the regimentation of military life. This project ended with
14
the units being disbanded by 1897, but the war in Europe sparked 
more discussion on the s u b j e c t . ^ 3
Sells, the reform groups, and military officers could not 
reach a consensus on the format for Indians in the military 
service, but they did generally agree that Indians should have 
the opportunity to serve their country. The dispute centered on 
the issue of whether Native Americans would be organized in 
segregated or integrated units. Sells advocated the integrated 
units as a way of hastening assimilation into white society. 
Reform groups such as the Society of American Indians supported 
Sells on this point, but legislative action, promoted by Joseph 
Kossath Dixon, called for the creation of segregated Indian 
units. Each Indian recruit would receive citizenship as well. 
Sells objected to this arrangement by claiming that these units 
would not provide citizenship training for Indians. He won 
critical support from Captain Richard Henry Pratt who changed 
his initial position to support the integrated units because he 
was in favor of speedy assimilation.34
Faith in the quality of Indian soldiers proved itself in 
their enviable service record, but after World War I, the 
citizenship controversy re-erupted. Many reformers advocated 
automatic citizenship for veterans and Sells supported this 
movement. Others advocated legislation to confer citizenship 
upon all Indians and free them from government control. Sells 
hesitated to go that far. With the passage of an act in late
15
1919 that gave citizenship to all Indian veterans of World War 
I, the debate subsided until the following decade.^
Land policy plagued Sells more than any other single issue 
of his tenure. While conceding that some "incompetent" Native 
Americans required continued federal protection,, he was eager to 
release those whom he considered to be ready for life in white 
society. Unfortunately, this "progressive" notion destroyed 
more of the Indian land base than any single action since the 
passage of the 1887 Dawes Severalty Act. Knowledge and cultural 
sensitivity, not merely good intentions, were the necessary 
ingredients for a proper national Indian policy, but these were 
sadly lacking in the late ninteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and Sells’ administration was no exception.
16
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CHAPTER ONE: LAND POLICY
Throughout the early twentieth century, the Indian
Bureau and most reform groups continued to promote a
process of assimilation for Native Americans, a process
which had received major impetus under the Dawes Severalty
Act of 1887. Although many Indians accepted the hasty
timetable for absorption as demanded by white officials,
others pled for a slower evolutionary change. One Crow
leader who addressed the Indian Rights Association
articulated the need for patience by saying:
it is nothing more than fair to permit 
us time enough to adapt ourselves to 
the new conditions forced upon us, to 
the new mode of living, the new competitive 
methods of gaining a livelihood, the new 
line of reasoning, and all these new 
conditions which the white man with his 
knowledge of things handed down from ages, 
and which it has taken him this length of 
time to master, and which he asks us to 
assimilate in a fortnight .
The Dawes Act outlined an assimilation plan in which 
government protection of allotments for twenty-five year 
trust periods would provide time for Native Americans to
develop their agricultural skills and ease themselves into
a competitive marketplace. This act allotted land in
different amounts, starting with 160 acres for the head of
a household, eighty acres for children over eighteen years 
of age, and forty acres for children under eighteen years.
18
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During the trust period, Indians paid no taxes on the 
land and they were unable to transfer land title to other 
peoples, but congressional legislation gradually enpowered 
the Secretary of the Interior to hasten the end of this 
protective status and open the individual claims to public 
s a l e .  ^ Most of the problems rested in states west of the 
Mississippi River and included a wide range of concerns. 
Among the most significant were the new pace of release of 
Indian allotments from government protection, the 
administration of minors' estates in Oklahoma, and the 
protection of Indian water rights in western states.
The Burke Act of 1906 allowed the Secretary of the 
Interior to grant competency certificates to those 
allottees whom he considered ready for the responsibility 
before the twenty-five year protection period had ended. 
This came about as a result of pressure from white 
developers in the west. In general, this relaxation of 
policy disintegrated individual allotments and other 
financial resources because Indians were unable to handle 
the new property tax burden and to find adequate sources of 
credit to expand farming or livestock raising.^ Despite 
the disastrous results of this weakening of the original 
policy, no new protective legislation had been established 
by the time Cato Sells took office in 1913. Like his 
predecessors, the new commissioner's philosophy centered on 
quickly making Indians a part of white society because he
20
believed firmly that Indians needed to be responsible for 
their own affairs. However, rather than rashly granting 
titles to every Indian who desired one, he adopted a more 
moderate approach.^
Sells focused his plan on the newly created 
competency commissions which were assigned the task of 
evaluating the capitalistic abilities of individual 
Indians. He issued certificates of competency sparingly in 
his first years, even falling short of the expectations of 
Secretary Franklin K. Lane and various reform groups. The 
Indian-edited Word Carrier claimed that Sells moved too 
slowly in granting these certificates and that his 
paternalistic attitudes would drag Indians into p a u p e r i s m . ^  
Contrastingly, in the same year, the Word Carrier printed a 
reader’s letter claiming that Sells’ policy permitted the 
exploitation of Indians because most who received 
certificates were not prepared to handle their affairs.^ 
Both criticisms contained accurate observations because in 
some cases competent Native Americans were overlooked by 
the commissions, while some incompetents were released 
because of white pressure for land and resource 
development.^
The commissions developed out of former Commissioner 
Robert G. Valentine’s plan which was utilized on the Omaha 
Reservation in Nebraska to speed the awarding of land 
titles in fee simple. Sells appointed Major James
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McLaughlin, a former Indian Bureau inspector, and F.A. 
Thackery, former superintendent of the Pima Reservation, to 
head the commissions in 1914 . Their assignment was to tour 
reservations and review lists compiled by local 
superintendents of potential candidates for compentency 
certificates. Once these commissions began to work 
efficiently, the number of issued patents rose 
dramatically. After the first year, 576 patents had been 
granted, and by 1920, Lane and Sells had given over 20,000 
patents, which directly affected over one million acres.®
To accompany these commissions, Secretary Lane 
created a ceremony for the granting of competency patents. 
The first step was for the Indian to step out of a teepee 
and shoot an arrow. He would then drop the bow and place 
his hands on a plow as a symbol of his acceptance of the 
white way of farming and the gospel of hard work. He 
likewise received a purse to remind him to save what he 
earned and to be thrifty. At the end of the ceremony, the 
new citizen would repeat the following pledge:
Forasmuch as the President has said 
that I am worthy to be a citizen of the 
United States, I now promise this flag 
that I will give my hands, my head, and 
my heart to the doing of all that will 
make me a true American citizen.®
The Indian Rights Association agreed with Sells that 
competency rulings demanded separate decisions for each
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individual Indian, rather than as a blanket policy for 
entire reservations. This reform group often relayed 
stories of competency problems to Sells. One such case 
involved a South Dako.ta Indian allottee who repeatedly lost 
hay to white speculators who claimed part of his land. 
Indian Rights Association trouble shooter Matthew K.
Sniffen asked Sells to intervene and protect this Indian 
because he could not handle his own affairs. Sells settled 
this case in favor of the Indian, but other reformers saw 
this as the commissioner protecting a ward of the 
government, and others saw the Indian relying upon a 
government, crutch, rather than developing his own 
accommodationist skills. ' Secretary Lane agreed with the 
latter interpretation. He claimed in 1915 that "we are not 
looking for an ideal Indian nor a model citizen, but for 
one who should no longer lean upon the Government to manage
his affairs."10
These new citizens, for which Lane so diligently 
searched, were not that easy to find because many people 
disagreed about what it meant to be competent for 
citizenship. General Richard Henry Pratt, founder of 
Pennsylvania's Carlisle Indian School, claimed that the 
best solution to the acculturation problem was to educate 
Indians. He felt that most Native Americans were currently 
unable to handle their own affairs because of ignorance.
In his mind, education would provide long-term protection
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for Indians, while continued government control over their 
land would keep them in a cycle of dependence. Gabe E . 
Parker, of the Board of Indian Commissioners, took the 
notion a step further by observing that Indians had no 
concept of money or the true value of land that they 
possessed. He advocated a protected forty acres of 
homestead land that could not be sold. The rest of the 
allotment, however, should be sold to enrich the smaller 
plot because Native Americans could not handle the larger 
area s .11
More requests flooded the Indian Bureau and the 
mainstream reformist periodicals about how to handle this 
matter. Francis LaFlesche, a well-known Omaha Indian, 
pleaded with Sells to .help his people who had seen their 
tribal funds distributed on a per capita basis. He claimed 
that most of the members, especially the uneducated, had 
squandered their money, and were now economically 
devastated. In contrast to the spendthrifts, many 
educated and competent Indians resisted patents because 
they did not favor the unprotected status of their land, 
nor the taxes that went along with it. They saw 
citizenship as a detriment to the continued tribal way of 
life which they preferred. Lane and Sells fought the 
hardest against these cases by sending registered letters 
through the mail declaring these Indians competent and 
forcing the responsibility upon t h e m . 13
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Warren K. Moorehead, of the Board of Indian
\
Commissioners, also proposed a solution to this problem in 
1913. He advocated a nine-man national commission to run 
Indian Affairs. This group would hold all existing land of 
incompetent Indians for another ten years, and then 
determine their competency from lists assembled by local 
superintendents according to Indian blood quantum. Persons 
with less Indian blood would be considered first for 
certificates. Moorehead admitted that his plan was not 
visionary, but it was practical, and it would also save the 
government money and relieve Congress of bureaucratic work. 
Moorehead’s opponents argued that if the plan were 
implemented, Indians would remain dependent on the 
government for another ten years without gaining any means 
for more education or training.^ This proposal was 
defeated, but the Indian Bureau still faced mounting 
pressure to hasten the individualization process.
Responding to this reality, Sells issued a new policy 
on competency in 1917, which he outlined in five major 
provisions. The most significant section released from 
government supervision all able-bodied Indians of half- 
blood or less with a patent fee for their homestead. This 
action released many Indians into white society in one 
broad stroke. Other features of the new policy included a 
more liberal stance on the sale and leasing of land held by 
old and feeble Indians, the release of some tribal money to
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individuals, and the elimination of ineligible pupils from 
government schools. Sells declared this to be a new all- 
encompassing policy to liberate Indians from government 
control and to help solve the Indian problem.^
The American Indian Magazine, which was the voice of 
the Society of American Indians, also advocated a more 
liberal policy concerning competency. It claimed that 
Indians were not competent or incompetent but, rather they 
were divided among the educated and uneducated 
categories.^  William A. Brown of the Indian Rights 
Association supported Sells, and he believed that if these 
new guidelines were not implemented then no more progress 
could be made on behalf of Indians. He contended that the 
major obstacle for Sells was the poor quality of some 
employees in the Indian Service who were responsible for 
the implementation of the policy. ^  The Board of Indian 
Commissioners also supported Sells' new policy which they 
said mirrored the platform that their group had been 
advocating for a quarter of a century.^
Even though the Indian Rights Association supported 
this new policy, it collectively took an additional step 
and supported the Carter Bill of 1919. This congressional 
legislation proposed many of the same concepts that Sells1 
new policy did, but included a clause that called for the 
dissolution of tribal rolls and funds, and the distribution 
of money to each member. Many believed that this would
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provide more incentive for Indians to be self- 
sufficient.-*-^ In addition to the Indian Rights 
Association, groups like the Women's National Indian 
Association supported the bill, even though it never became 
law. Sells in his annual report of 1919, staunchly claimed 
that he would not be "hastened to release people before 
they are ready to handle the unsrupulous trickery of 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . "20 j n  h j _ s  own defense, Sells emphasized the 
increase in the number of competency certificates issued 
under his administration. Between 1906 and 1916, 9,894
Indians were released from government supervision, while 
from 1916 to 1919, nearly 11,000 Indians had been 
"liberated."21
Sells' record on freeing Native Americans from 
government control seemed impressive. He satisfied the 
hurried intention of Secretary Lane and many reform groups 
to some extent. In answer to dissenters from the other 
side of the argument, he claimed that he made a careful 
study of each case to ensure that Indians would not be 
released if they were not able to handle their own affairs. 
In the end, the overly quick release of so many Indians and 
their money proved disastrous, and demonstrated that Sells 
was not as attentive to the details as he had p r o m i s e d .22 
The Curtis Act of 1908 released numerous Indians from 
restrictions on their land. This measure went further to 
place the affairs of minors in Oklahoma under local
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jurisdiction, and led to massive corruption of the probate 
court system in Oklahoma as the multitude of cases were 
reviewed. Numerous "professional guardians" appeared to 
assume the protective roles for these children when, in 
reality, most were out for their own profit. This often 
resulted in the children losing their estates in a 
convoluted and self-serving judicial system about which 
they knew very little. 23 gy 1914, Sells had seen enough 
injustice in the probation of minors' estates in Oklahoma 
to move him to issue new guidelines. These rules required 
the approval of local, state and county judges before being 
enforced. First, each guardian must submit to the court an 
annual or semi-annual report on the status of the 
allotment. Second, for any sale of land, the minor must 
give his unmolested permission. Third, for a bid to be 
recognized, the bidder must present in cash at least ten 
percent of the bid. If these guidelines were not followed, 
then no sale would take place. Sells went even further to 
advocate rules over the guardians themselves. Guardians 
must advertise a sale at least five days prior to the 
event. Once the money was received, the guardian must keep 
his personal finances and those of the minor separate. If 
the guardians did not follow these guidelines, they would 
lose their status as guardians.24
Sells was inspired to issue these tougher guidelines 
because of the numerous reports he had received about the
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unethical behavior of attorneys and guardians. 
Investigations into the Creek Nation's probation of minors' 
estates revealed many problems. On the average, attorneys 
received twenty-percent of the sale as payment, which was 
at least fifteen-percent higher then that received for 
white estate sales. Internal investigations conducted by 
the tribe revealed little information, except from Kate 
Barnard who was Director of the Oklahoma Commission of 
Charities and Corrections. She labeled this a conspiracy, 
intended to strip the land from Oklahoma's Indian 
population, a conspiracy that began with policy makers in 
Washington, D.C., and trickled down to the local level in 
Oklahoma. She sharply criticized Sells' new probate policy 
as trivial because, in order for these guidelines to be 
binding, the local, state and county judges had to approve 
them. She believed that it was these same local judges who 
were the root of the problem. She chastised the guidelines 
for only delaying the proper protection that was needed.^5 
Barnard claimed that the conspiracy had started in 
1908 when the federal government released the power of 
probate to the newly formed state of Oklahoma. She 
estimated that the profit from this unethical behavior was 
about two hundred million dollars for unscrupulous judges. 
Her agency, the Oklahoma Commission of Charities and 
Corrections, acted as the only legal body in the state to 
protect Indian rights. Just five days before many tribal
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rolls were opened for the distribution of nearly 
$35,000,000 to individual Native Americans, her agency was 
dissolved, leaving her powerless to help the Indians.26 
Sells acknowledged the problem and vowed to investigate, 
but nothing ever came of it.
Many reform groups joined Barnard in her disgust over 
this issue. The Women's National Indian Association urged 
Congress and Sells to enact guidelines that would .protect 
Oklahoma Indian minors from losing their estates. This 
group claimed that one of the most severe problems was that 
the appointed guardians did not always work in the child's 
best interest.
The Word Carrier and William Murray of the Lake 
Mohonk Conference called on Sells to restrict the sale of 
minors' estates, which left leasing as the only option. 
Murray feared that this land was being sold unnecesarily by 
immoral judges, and he demanded punishment of the guilty.
He further criticized Sells' guidelines for Indians of 
three-quarter blood or more having their homesteads and 
allotments controlled by the government, and those who had 
one-half to three-quarters blood having their homesteads 
restricted. In short, Murray wanted stricter guidelines to 
protect the minors in Oklahoma, but the adults of three- 
quarter blood or less should be free of all government 
rest riction.2 8
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Representing the opposite point of view was George
Vaux of the Board of Indian Commissioners, who, in 1916,
contended that most of the Osage from Oklahoma were not
prepared to handle their allotments or their other
finances. Each member of this tribe had received an
estimated $10,000 from the distribution of their tribal
funds several years earlier. The majority had wasted their
portion and were now destitute. Vaux claimed that this
showed that even adult Indians could not handle their
responsibilities and should receive the same protection as 
7 Qminors .^  ^
As the debate raged in 1916, Oklahoma Senator William 
Hastings proposed legislation to further strengthen the 
power of the local superintendents in the state. With so 
vast an Indian population in Oklahoma, it was difficult for 
Sells and Secretary Lane to oversee all of their matters, 
according to Hastings. He therefore advocated that 
Congress turn over to the local superintendents much of the 
power that the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs held.^O The Indians' worst fears were 
realized in this proposed legislation. The Indian School 
Journalr published by apprentices at the Indian school in 
Chilocco, Oklahoma, along with many other Indian 
periodicals, reacted strongly against this legislation.
They feared the strong possibilities of improper and 
arbitrary behavior by the superintendents. In theory, this
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bill would provide more personalized attention from the 
superintendents, but in reality there would be less 
supervision of the Indian Bureau employees than ever 
before.31
Fortunately, this legislation did not pass and the 
power remained with the federal government to the 
satisfaction of Lane, Sells and others involved in Indian 
matters. Some children benefitted from this new policy and 
their property was protected, but most still suffered at 
the hands of their guardians. Barnard's warnings proved to 
be partially correct because enforcement of the new probate 
rules were weakened. By 1919, the Oklahoma legislature 
passed measures that released local courts from Sells' 
rules and left the creation of rules to each individual 
court. These new laws proved to be most damaging to 
Oklahoma's Indian children.32
Sells, in his final annual report, referred to a most 
horrifying case of exploitation of a minor in Oklahoma by 
her guardian. In this case, a young woman who could not 
read, write, or speak English was to be paid $2,900 for 
land she had inherited. As far as the probate attorney and 
county judge knew, she would receive the entire amount.
Yet, since she could not handle her own affairs, a guardian 
orchestrated the transaction. Once the check was issued, 
she and the guardian cashed it and the guardian received 
one-half of the money as a fee for his services. In this
case, Sells cancelled the deed to protect the woman. He 
proclaimed that he protected this Indian woman and many 
other Native Americans in Oklahoma.33 jn reality, however 
this one example clearly illuminated how large and 
pervasive was the problem of probating these estates.
Despite these problems, Sells still approached the 
liberation of Indians from government supervision as the 
primary objective of his administration. The main.vehicle 
for this new freedom was agriculture. He believed that if 
Native Americans could become viable farmers, they could 
then live and compete in white society. Early in his term 
he declared that he would make the Indian into "the 
American Cattle King."34 Sells felt that the most 
pressing agricultural dilemma for Native Americans was 
irrigation availabiility and the protection of water 
rights. Since most of the Indians involved in agriculture 
lived in the arid regions of the western United States, 
access to water became the central issue around which this 
debate revolved.
Irrigation projects began soon after the Civil War 
for Indians living in the driest parts of the Great Basin 
and the Southwest. These projects were designed to aid 
Native Americans in their agricultural pursuits, but also 
to keep them separate from the majority of white society. 
From the early projects of the 1860s and 1870s to the time 
of Sells' administration, the amount of irrigation money
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appropriated by the federal government varied greatly. In 
1867, only $50,000 was designated for irrigation projects, 
but by 1916, over one-third of a million dollars was 
mandated for these projects. The increase primarily took 
place because of the 1914 shift from the federal government 
paying for projects to a new policy of charging the tribes 
directly.^5 Although some white reformers feared that 
these new guidelines would bankrupt the tribes, the Board 
of Indian Commissioners recommended the hurried building of 
irrigation projects funded by tribal money. The Board 
asserted that Indian funds could not be spent without their 
consent, so Native Americans automatically were protected 
against exploitation. In addition, the new uniform 
accounting system for irrigation projects allowed for the 
value of land to be judged at a more equitable price. The 
Board’s major argument for the self-financing of irrigation 
systems rested on the notion that persons who benefit from 
a service should pay for it.^6
Sells, however, remained cautious about forcing 
tribes to pay for all water projects. He promised that he 
would eventually force the responsibility of payment onto 
those who benefitted from the projects, rather than upon 
the Indian population as a whole. At this time, Sells saw 
more Indians taking on farming as a way of life and he was 
fearful of hurting their chances of success by placing 
another financial burden on them. Likewise, he saw a need
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for Indians to have more access to sources of capital and 
credit to improve the quality of their land. In his 
opinion, many Native Americans could not efficiently 
cultivate their entire allotments without the proper tools 
and supplies. Furthermore, Sells held that a liberal 
policy of leasing surplus land would provide the necessary 
capital while simultaneously relieving Indian families of 
"excess lands" which could be taxed in the future. For 
competent Indians to lease their land, they simply needed 
the permission of their superintendent, unlike incompetents 
who continued to have their leases negotiated by agents.
In one year, early in Sells' tenure, nearly 1200 competent 
and incompetent Indians received permission for intiating 
leases. The amount of money brought in by these 
individuals increased t r e m e n d o u s l y . 37
Yet, just a year later, in early 1915, the New York 
Times reported a story of Indians in Montana who were 
starving because their tribal funds had been manipulated by 
white investors. The Crow Reservation held over $900,000 
in tribal funds, but all of the money had been committed to 
irrigation projects. Time and time again, individual 
Indians had leased their land to investors in order to 
raise funds for their irrigation projects, which, in turn, 
left them without land to farm and money to support 
themselves. Once the irony became apparent, most reformers 
spoke out against the leasing of land to persons from
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outside the r e s e r v a t i o n . 38 This one example showed that 
the exploitation that Sells and the Board of Indian 
Commissioners promised would not occur had become a 
reality.
Many reformers saw cases like this as an argument for 
the protection of irrigation rights on behalf of Native 
Americans. Sells acknowledged that Indian irrigation 
rights were weakened in some cases and, in 1915, he offered 
the Utes of the Unitah Reservation as an example. These 
Indians experienced problems with receiving water from the 
streams on their reservation. Sells launched a special 
investigation and found that white farmers who lived north 
of the reservation had diverted much of the water from 
streams to which the Native Americans held legal rights.
By 1919, a favorable decision was expected from the federal 
courts, and, in the interim, a water commissioner was 
appointed to regulate the water. However, a drought and 
unscrupulous water regulators plunged the Indians of the 
Unitah Reservation into despair. They fought for financial 
assistance and tighter regulations on water allocations 
until a decision was reached. By 1920, they had regained 
their rights to the streams which eventually led to 
improved irrigation and f a r m i n g . 3 9
Far worse was the abuse of Pima water rights at 
Arizona's Gila Reservation. Between 1871 and 1910, this 
desert reservation experienced the most profound water
36
shortage of any reservation in the country. The 
reservation inhabitants referred to this time as "forty 
years of famine. To solve this problem, the Gila River 
needed to be dammed to divert water to more of the 
reservation. In 1910, the Roosevelt Dam was completed and 
many Pimas marked this as the end to their hardships, even 
though water shortages remained a reality for many years. 
The Indian Bureau experienced difficulty in efficiently 
managing this reservation because of its remote location 
and insensitive superintendents who proved inattentive to 
resource management . ^
Sells expressed concern for all Indians who lived on 
arid reservations and who relied on farming for their 
livelihood. He especially complemented the Pimas for their 
strength in the face of adversity, which he believed no 
white man could have endured. During a personal visit to 
the reservation, he expressed concern about the future flow 
of water from the Roosevelt Dam. Many Pimas made it clear 
to him that they wished to build a dam on their own 
reservation to insure that they would always have an 
adequate supply of w a t e r B y  1918, Sells approved the 
petition for the building of a dam which he believed would 
provide more water for the inhabitants, as well as protect 
the river bed from erosion. The reservation opened itself 
to take bids for this project which was supposed to be 
substantially funded by Pima money. No bids were issued
37
because it was known that the tribe did not have enough 
funds to pay for it. This left many tribal members 
despondent about the future, but others did not give up the 
struggle.  ^^
In order to raise the money for the project, the 
Pimas did two things. First, they leased more of their 
land to outsiders. Second, they called for F.A. Thackery 
to return because they needed a strong administrator to 
help run their affairs. The Indian Rights Association took 
an active role in questioning this turn of events. In one 
of the association's anonymous pamphlets, the author 
criticized Sells for pushing the Pimas to lease their land 
when it was evident that many of the leasings were not in 
the best interest of the Indians. The pamphlet contended 
that Sells was simply reacting to the pressures exerted by 
the Pima's white neighbors. Yet, Thackery took charge of 
the reservation and all seemed well for a time.44
About three years after his return to the 
reservation, the Indian Rights Association charged Thackery 
with diverting water off of the reservation for private 
gain. Thackery supposedly allowed nearby white farmers to 
use the reservation water for a fee which he kept for 
personal income. The Indian Rights Association and Sells 
conducted investigations, but nothing conclusive pointed to 
Thackery as the culprit. Nonetheless, the Indian Rights 
Association called for Thackery's dismissal, which Sells
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refused. He simply transferred Thackery to another post, 
but this did not satisfy the clamorings from the Indian 
Rights Association and the incident provided a breaking 
point between Sells and the a s s o c i a t i o n . In the past, 
Sells generally had responded to reports of impropriety by 
transfering Bureau employees rather than dismissing them. 
The Indian Rights Association usually yielded to Sells' 
wishes in order to maintain a good relationship with the 
commissioner, but not in the Thackery case.
The Navajo Reservation in Arizona and New Mexico also 
experienced tremendous difficulty in obtaining water for 
its agricultural endeavors. Sells addressed this problem 
by pointing out that only 6,500 acres of the 12,000,000 
acres of this reservation could be irrigated. Although he 
funded investigations to see whether or not any irrigation 
projects should be initiated to provide more water to this 
reservation, he did not propose any new funding for 
projects. Instead, he repeatedly referred to the tribe's 
economic self-sufficiency and their other marketable skills 
in crafts and rugs as means of enhancing their income
Likewise, Sells examined the placement of wells that 
were twenty-five to thirty miles apart and did not serve 
the needs of the reservation. He proposed a plan that 
would develop these wells so they would provide an ample 
water supply for the entire reservation. A field employee 
observed that many of the inhabitants were eager to work
39
with Sells and the Indian Bureau. He said that the 
Navajoes were grateful to know that "The Great White Father 
at Washington has at last come to their rescue, by sending 
men and machinery with which to develop their water 
resources."47
Many critics of the Indian Bureau policy of helping 
Native Americans with reservation irrigation projects 
claimed that Sells moved too quickly for the Indians he 
served. They pointed out that the land Sells tried to 
develop for these projects was so agriculturally 
unmanagable that even experienced white farmers failed to 
make it productive. On this basis, they called for Sells 
to discontinue his efforts to irrigate this land for the 
Native Americans on these reservations and let the land be 
open for sale and leasing to cattle and mineral 
interest s .4 8
Overall, Sells' land policy of withdrawing federal 
protective status hurt many more Indians than it helped. 
While he did protect some minors in Oklahoma, the majority 
still suffered losses at the hands of their guardians.
Over half of the Indian land in Oklahoma was rendered 
useless by the 1930s because it had been subdivided so many 
times into small plots that no heirs could utilize it 
properly. By 1934, the Indian estate had been reduced by 
80 million acres from 138 million in 1887 to 52 million. 
Much of this land was unusable because of "checkerboarding
40
and complicated land title, overgrazing and erosion, or 
lack of irrigat ion . 1 ^ ^  Sells produced similar results in 
his protectionist policies toward water rights in the West. 
The problem rested on his poor conceptualization of the 
policy, as well as his reliance on persons who administered 
it. Like his predecessors, he tried to simultaneously 
protect and liberate Native Americans, a process which sent 
conflicting messages to all persons involved in the debate, 
and thus, further eroded traditional treaty rights.
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CHAPTER TWO: INDIAN BUREAU REFORM
In 1915, the New York Times exposed alleged corruption 
among Indian Bureau employees on Montana's Crow Reservation. 
Supposedly, a number of employees took land away from Native 
Americans for their own use, including one unnamed official 
who took 320 acres from Knows His Coups without permission or 
compensation. The Indian Rights Association, along with many 
Indians from the reservation, protested these violations and 
called on Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells to remedy 
the situation. In response to this pressure, the 
commissioner removed superintendent Winfield Scott from the 
reservation and placed him in another Bureau office in 
Oklahoma. When Sells nominated Z. Lewis Dalby as the new 
Superintendent of the Crow Reservation, the Indian Rights 
Association objected and claimed that Dalby was guilty of the 
same improper behavior as his predecessor. Sells believed 
that transferring Scott would solve the problem, but he 
actually infuriated even more Native Americans, Indian Rights 
Association leaders, and members of Congress.
Oregon Senator Harry Lane attacked Sells for merely 
transferring Scott rather than dismissing him, especially in 
light of the strong charges brought by Helen Pierce Grey who 
was a resident of the Crow Reservation. She charged that 
Scott had forged many official government records which left 
the ownership of some land in question. Grey asserted that
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the immediate result of this exploitation was the loss of 
land and livelihood for Indians, as well as starvation in 
some of the worst cases. Sells defended Scott's 
administrative record, but noted that the current 
superintendent was powerless because of inept leasing 
policies of previous administrations. The commissioner 
asserted that Scott was not transferred because of the 
accusations or investigation, but rather it was a normal 
transfer consistent with Bureau activities. Most people 
involved in Indian matters understandably did not believe 
Sells' rather transparent explanation.1
Sells further investigated the problems on this 
reservation and again declared that the problem originated 
with his predecessors and their policies, but he assured his 
critics that he would take steps to help the Indians. The 
main problem, Sells claimed, was that the land in question 
had no fences to mark ownership, and therefore it was left as 
open range. Assistant Commissioner Edgar Merritt supported 
these findings and cleared Scott of any impropriety. Sells 
closed his investigation by asserting that the Indians of the 
Crow Reservation were not starving, and this had been 
conclusively proven in a report he had received a month 
earlier from Superintendent Scott.2
From its beginnings, the Indian Bureau had been plagued 
with numerous charges against employees for improper 
behavior. During the last two decades of the nineteenth
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century, the Indian Bureau had nearly doubled in its number 
of employees, from 2,102 in 1881 to 3,917 in 1897.3 The 
employment explosion caused many additional problems for the 
Bureau and its commissioners because the hurried selection of 
employees failed to place quality people in vital positions.
As the Indian wars wound down in the late nineteenth century, 
Indian Bureau employees took positions at new agencies 
throughout the United States, and this made even more 
difficult the task of supervising employees from the main 
office in Washington, D.C.
After the 1891 massacre of Sioux at Wounded Knee, the 
Indian Bureau adopted civil service regulations for its 
employees to improve their quality and to ensure that a 
bloody incident of this magnitude would not occur again.
Later in the 1890s, the Indian Rights Association 
uncharacteristically supported the idea of placing army 
officers into vacant Indian Bureau posts to ensure the high 
moral character of the employees.  ^ Nonetheless, army 
officers did not take Bureau positions and this government 
agency continued to be run by civilian employees. By the 
time Sells took office, many reformers thought that the 
Bureau had grown too large. They likewise believed that the 
responsibilities of the Bureau were too great for one man's 
supervision because the agency had increased its varied roles 
since the end of the Indian wars.^
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The nature of the Bureau also lent itself to political 
paybacks. Politicians had long considered this office to be 
one of the least important within the government bureaucracy, 
and they had awarded its positions to cronies without causing 
many public outcries. Sells was sensitive to this practice 
because he had been personally charged with receiving his own 
appointment as a political gift from President Woodrow Wilson 
for his support in the 1912 presidential campaign. From the 
commissioner on down, political intrigue played a role in the 
selection of employees which, in turn, damaged the 
credibility and integrity of the entire Bureau. Sells, thus 
felt compelled to address a multitude of allegations about 
unethical behavior of Indian Bureau employees, reform 
measures proposed by the Indian Rights Association, and 
reform legislation proposed by Congress.^
Improving the daily administration of the Indian Bureau 
became one of Sells1 top priorities. He noted, in his first 
annual report to the Secretary of the Interior in 1913, that 
the volume of letters the Bureau received had increased from 
222,187 in 1912, to 275,452 in 1913, a 23.9% increase. The 
number of letters sent out by the Bureau also increased 
dramatically from 201,271 to 255,261 in the same year, a 
26.4% increase. Sells credited this increase in mail traffic 
to his new individualization policy which demanded more 
communication between field employees and the main office in 
Washington, D.C.^
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Sells emphasized these statistics so he could praise the 
work of the employees in his service and show the skeptics 
that this Bureau was dedicated to the assistance of Indians. 
He called on Bureau employees to be role models for Indians 
and often encouraged Native Americans to take positions in 
the Bureau as well. He encouraged direct Indian 
participation at every level to improve their own situation 
and to show their people how to live in the white world.
When Sells first took office, he conducted a re-evaluation of 
all employees to determine their future role in the Indian 
Bureau. He proposed that a group of inspectors from Schedule 
B of the Civil Service be assembled to prepare reports on the 
competence and efficiency of Bureau employees. From these 
reports he concluded that the Indian Bureau could save money 
by suspending all Sunday work by Bureau employees except in 
emergency cases. Sells had discovered that many employees 
reported work hours on Sundays which seemed unnecessary, and 
in some cases downright questionable.^
Prior to Sells becoming commissioner, employees 
transfered frequently from one post to another for no 
apparent reason. He quickly put an end to this arbitrary 
practice so that continuity could be established on each 
reservation. Furthermore, Sells felt that the commonly- held 
notion that Indians were racially inferior was now giving way 
to a public awareness that large numbers of Native Americans 
had already adopted white customs. With the goal of
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establishing this new "equality" between Indians and whites, 
Sells instructed his employees to stop calling Native 
Americans by pejorative terms such as "buck, squaw, or 
redskin," and he searched for Indian school graduates to fill 
agency jobs.^
The Board of Indian Commissioners shared Sells 1 view 
that most Bureau employees were competent, well— intentioned, 
and good role models for Indians. Yet, the restriction 
placed on many employees by previous administrations limited 
their ability to serve. The most profound problem with 
Bureau employees, according to the Board, was the amount of 
paperwork each employee was expected to handle. In one year 
the main office of the Bureau sent out 122 memorandums. This 
averaged about one memo per employee every three days, which 
created a flood of paper and interferred with the more 
important field work. In the end, the Board determined that 
the constantly changing policy from one administration to the 
next created confusion among employees and generally produced 
poor results for Indians.^
The Indian Rights Association also took an interest in 
the administration of the Bureau, especially the activities 
of Bureau agents. This association employed field 
representatives to visit the reservations and judge the 
quality of services delivered to Indians. Sells received 
numerous allegations from these Indian Rights Association
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investigators about the behavior of Indian Bureau employees 
and the failures of certain facets of federal protection.^
In 1914, Sells acknowledged one such problem in the form 
of the high infant mortality rate among full-blood Indians.
He issued a statement to all field matrons instructing them 
to go into the homes of pregnant women and show them 
practical skills such as sewing and cooking. Once the baby 
was born, Sells urged the matrons to provide proper care and 
nourishment so the babies had a chance for survival in the 
world.
A .F . MacColl, a former Indian Bureau employee, charged 
many Bureau employees with "not car [ing] a hoot" about 
Indians because they did not generally look after the well­
being of infant children, a neglect which led to an infant 
mortality rate of sixty percent on some reservations.
MacColl asserted that these employees were of poor character, 
but he felt that complaining to Sells would do little to 
remedy the situation, and he looked forward to a new 
commissioner.12
Similarly, Reverend Philip Gordon, of the Society of 
American Indians, held Sells responsible for the death of 
Louis Martin, an Indian resident of Hayward, Wisconsin.
Martin had frozen to death in his cabin which contained no 
water or food, and little wood for a fire. He was an elderly 
man and for years his distant neighbors had helped provide 
for him in tough times, but the distance and the severity of
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the winter left him with no neighborly help. Superintendent 
F.J. McQuigg provided all of the assistance he could for 
Martin, but the rations distributed by the federal government 
were not enough. McQuigg had sent Sells a list of twenty-one 
people in his area who were in dire need of assistance from 
the Indian Bureau. He claimed that he had stretched his 
resources as far as possible, and he asked Sells to send $500 
to relieve the suffering of these people. McQuigg had asked 
for this money several months before Martin's death, but 
Sells failed to respond in time to save the man's life.^  
Because of these and similar incidents in the field, Sells 
endured a poor relationship with the Society of American 
Indians, Board of Indian Commissioners, and the Indian Rights 
Association, which harmed his career.^
At times, Indians tried to remove their own corrupt 
superintendents. The leaders of the Santee Reservation in 
Nebraska and the Yankton Reservation in South Dakota proposed 
that they combine their agencies in order to eliminate the 
superintendent position at the former location. The 
residents of this reservation claimed that Superintendent 
C.E. Burton had pushed many Native Americans to sell their 
allotments too quickly, and this had led to economic despair. 
Matthew K. Sniffen, of the Indian Rights Association, joined 
the Indians in urging that the commissioner dismiss Burton, 
and demonstrate to the rest of the Bureau employees that his 
administration would not tolerate such behavior. As in the
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previous case of Superintendent Winfield Scott of the Crow 
Agency, Sells refused to bow to the pressure of the Indian 
Rights Association and the inhabitants of the reservation. 
Instead, he transferred Burton to another reservation which 
alleviated the immediate problem, but only encouraged further 
instances of corruption.^
A year earlier, Samuel Brosius had reported unethical 
behavior by the superintendent and agency stockman at the 
Truxton Canyon Indian School in Valentine, Arizona. Stockman 
Willis allegedly took advantage of his position and branded 
much of the Indian cattle herd with his personal symbol, a 
practice which Superintendent Wadsworth ignored. Brosius 
claimed that Wadsworth and Willis had turned the school into 
their private plantation by seizing the best grazing land for 
themselves and leasing other parts to neighboring white 
farmers. Furthermore, in the school itself, Brosius charged 
that forced labor and severe punishment were common. These 
inexplicable actions sparked little concern from the 
surrounding white townspeople except when they called for the 
confinement of students to protect the community from the 
spread of diseases.^
Similarly, on the Fort Berthold Reservation in Montana, 
questions of immoral behavior arose concerning Superintendent 
H.F. Jermark who allegedly had sold grazing land to local 
white herders. Sniffen and other reformers likewise expected 
the superintendent to keep a close watch on the behavior of
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the reservation inhabitants, but Jermark apparently showed 
little concern at the high rate of unmarried pregnancies and 
forced marriages on his reservation. Sniffen also called for 
Sells to investigate rumors that the white female doctor on 
the reservation had advised Indians improperly about sex, 
marriage and morality.
Samuel Brosius sent a letter to Sells outlining special 
complaints about the general character of Martin Bentley who 
was an Indian Bureau employee in Oklahoma working to 
influence congressmen on Indian legislation. The Indian 
Rights Association investigated Bentley's background and 
discovered that he had a close relationship with a prostitute 
named Annie Pecon and even had two children with her. She 
had even fought to gain financial support for the children 
from Bentley. Brosius called on Sells to further investigate 
Bentley’s character, because the association felt that a 
person with such a questionable character could not 
adequately represent the best interests of Indians. Brosius 
listed several people who could testify to Bentley’s faulty 
character, including, ironically, F.A. Thackery, former 
superintendent on the Pima Reservation who himself had become 
involved with misuse of tribal water supplies.
A far worse case of immorality surfaced in the Pine 
Point Indian School in Minnesota. Principal N.B. Hurr was 
accused of living with a prostitute, while his wife allegedly 
had sexual encounters with Indian boys from the school.
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Finally, the couple divorced and the principal married the 
prostitute. Ultimately, Hurr was replaced by Louis Page who 
was accused of similar activity, except that Page eventually 
returned to his wife and child. The Supervising Nurse of 
this school, Luctretia T. Ross, brought these charges to 
Samuel Brosius of the Indian Rights Association, and he 
relayed them to Commissioner Sells. She listed more than a 
dozen cases in this school alone of immoral behavior by 
officials and pupils alike. She told stories of unmarried 
pregnancy, abortion and adultery, and concluded her 
blistering attack with the implication that the principals of 
this school had worked together secretly to organize 
prostitution among Indian girls. This charge was never 
proven.20
During September 1920, Brosius uncovered a different 
type of "moral depravity" on Nevada's Pyramid Lake 
Reservation where Superintendent Joseph D. Oliver was deemed 
unfit because he had "lost sympathy for the Indians."
Instead of setting a good example for Indians on how to live 
a better life, he took the law into his own hands. He 
carried a gun at all times and often shot livestock without 
provocation. He bought Indian livestock for personal use, 
took money for leasing privileges, and illegally purchased 
8,800 acres.21
Four years earlier, Superintendent Charles T. Coggeshal 
of California's Moronga Reservation was charged with improper
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behavior by the Indian Rights Association. He had arrested 
and detained Joe Pete, an Indian from another reservation, 
merely for entering the-Moronga Reservation. Pete reported 
his story to Brosius who investigated the matter and called 
on Sells to dismiss Coggeshal from the Bureau because he 
believed that the superintendent was a cocaine and opium 
addict. Sells refused to dismiss Coggeshal, but merely 
reassigned him to the Salt River Reservation in Arizona.^
Just a few months later, in 1916, the newly installed 
Superintendent Coggeshal was charged by Brosius with using at 
least $500 worth of Salt River Reservation gasoline for 
personal trips in his automobile, and secretly diverting 
small amounts of water from a reservation irrigation tank for 
his private swimming p o o l . 23 ^he Indian Rights Association 
openly criticized Sells' tendency to transfer rather than 
fire such reprehensible employees, and it made effective use 
of the Coggeshal case to warn about repeat offenders within 
the Bureau staff.
In response to these charges repeated by the Indian 
Rights Association, Sells claimed that he came to the office 
with only one purpose in mind and that was to work for the 
betterment of the Indians. The best way to accomplish this, 
he thought, was to avoid controversy, even if it meant not 
fully prosecuting guilty employees to solve the immediate 
problems. The Indian Rights Association called this transfer 
approach the "back door method," because it allowed the
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accused person to possibly perpetuate his crimes at another 
agency. Sells' evasive policy outraged the Indian Rights 
Association and many Indians, but he also faced frequent 
political pressure to keep certain individuals in his service 
regardless of their behavior.24
Irritation with Sells over the way he managed the Indian 
Bureau prompted Carl E . Grammer of the Indian Rights 
Association to demand in January of 1917, that Sells "strike 
terror and the fear of God into the hearts of some of these 
oppressors of the weak."25 ^  the same time Sniffen saw 
Sells as being too weak, so he demanded that the commissioner 
"administer the functions of this great responsibility as to 
merit the approval of all rightminded citizens."26
Throughout his administration, Sells did not ably handle 
the controversy about the behavior of Bureau employees. Some 
members of Congress agreed with the outspoken reformers and 
Indians that administrative personnel lacked the necessary 
moral fiber to attend to Native American needs. Most reform 
groups, including the Indian Rights Association, proposed 
plans to reform the Bureau, but Congress developed the most 
radical and far-reaching programs. The United States Senate 
considered two of these bills in 1916 which, if passed, would 
have altered the entire structure of the Indian Bureau.^ 
South Dakota Senator Edwin Johnson proposed a bill in 
1916 that would have placed the power of recall of 
superintendents in the hands of the adult male tribal
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members. The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs were required under law to respect and 
enforce the majority decision by the tribes. This placed the 
power of superintendent-selection in the hands of the adult 
male members of the tribe and further weakened the authority 
of the Indian Bureau. The proposal generally met with 
disapproval from reformers and the Indian Bureau alike.27 
The Women’s National Indian Association protested 
against this bill because they felt that the measure moved 
Indians too quickly toward independence, even though they 
agreed with the general underlying theory upon which it was 
b a s e d . 28 in early 1917, the Indian Rights Association 
circulated copies of its opposition to this bill to other 
reform groups, newspapers and government officials. Carl E. 
Grammer and Herbert Welsh of the Indian Rights Association 
protested against the bill because it would jeopardize the 
careers of competent employees and give Native Americans 
responsibilies for which they were not yet ready. The 
critical point for this association was a fear that full- 
blooded Indians, who were generally deemed less politically 
sophisticated, would fall prey to unscrupulous mixed-bloods 
and whites. Welsh warned that, because of these new 
guidelines, no "competent, self-respecting businessman" would 
ever take agency jobs, which would leave only poor candidates 
from which the Indians to c h o o s e . 29 Likewise, Samuel Brosius 
spoke before the Senate to try to persuade the Senate to
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defeat the bill. He reaffirmed Welsh's position that this 
bill would leave the "more dependent full-bloods . . . easy
prey of the conniving mixed-bloods and unscrupulous whites." 
Sherman Coolidge, President of the Society of American 
Indians, agreed with Brosius that this legislation could only 
bring despair to Indians.30
Joseph H. Choate, a member of the Society of Americans 
Indians, addressed the same point to Senator Henry F. Ashurst 
of Arizona He called on the government to uphold its duty to 
the nation's wards because the Indians generally were 
helpless, and the government had a reponsibility to protect 
them from outside corrupting forces. He supported the idea 
of detribalization of Indians, as put forth in the Dawes 
Severalty Act and by Commissioner Sells, but he warned 
against moving the wards too quickly toward citizenship.
Choate argued strongly against tribal or state control of 
Bureau employees because it would only encourage corruption, 
such as in the case of the probation of minors' estates in 
Oklahoma. In the end, Choate objected to the Johnson Bill 
because it would take power away from the federal government 
and leave it in the hands of some of the worst elements of 
society.^^
Former Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis Leupp, who 
held office from 1905 through 1909, also opposed the Johnson 
Bill because it provided too drastic a change too quickly.
He agreed with the theory of self-rule for Indians, but did
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not feel that this was the proper time for such independence. 
Having directed the Indian Bureau, Leupp felt that the 
majority of Indians were not ready to handle all of the 
responsibilities that accompanied citizenship.32 Likewise, 
in an anonymous article in the Indian School Journal, the 
author defended the Indian Bureau as the best agency for 
bringing Indians into citizenship. Yet, the writer did not 
subscribe to the viewpoint set forth in the Johnson Bill 
because this legislation would reduce the power of the Indian 
Bureau. The author agreed with Secretary of the Interior 
Franklin K. Lane's more moderate approach of granting 
citizenship only to those who could prove their competence.^ 
Senator Johnson felt the growing pressure on his bill as 
a piece of national legislation so he amended it to include 
only South Dakota. Despite his adjustments, the Senate did 
not pass the bill, primarily because of the objections that 
flooded the Senate from the Indian Bureau, Native Americans 
and reform groups. Yet, Senator Harry Lane of Oregon 
supported the Johnson Bill and proposed a bill of his own 
that would take Johnson's idea further by calling for the 
complete elimination of the Indian Bureau.^
Senator Lane wanted the Bureau of Indian Affairs to be 
removed from the Department of the Interior, placed under the 
control of Congress, and administered by three commissioners. 
A council of all the Indian tribes in the United States would 
be assembled to select five candidates for the three
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positions. The number of representatives for each tribe 
would be based on population. The tribes with more than 
1,000 members would receive three delegates, those with 
between 500 and 1,000 members would receive two delegates, 
and those with less than 500 members would be represented by 
one delegate. The duties of this new triumverate would be 
identical to those presently held by the Secretary of the 
Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.^5
Once the council submitted its list of five candidates, 
the President of the United States would choose three from 
this list, with the Senate's approval. Each of these 
commissioners would receive a salary of $5,000 per year. The 
first duty of the new commissioners would be to reorganize 
the Indian Bureau to ensure that all Indians in the United 
States were free from "control, supervision, and management 
of the United States G o v e r n m e n t . R e g a r d l e s s  of their 
allotment status, all Native Americans were to be immediately 
released from wardship, and declared full citizens of the 
United States and of the state in which they resided. A 
$35,000 fund would be established to finance the travel and 
expenses of the delegates to guarantee that all tribes were 
fairly represented.^
Critics argued even more fervently against the Lane Bill 
than they had against the Johnson Bill. Former Commissioner 
Francis Leupp bitterly opposed this action based on two 
fundamental principles. First, he supported the idea of
self-rule for Native Americans, but this bill moved too 
quickly for most Indians and would expose them to the worst 
elements of society. Second, Leupp objected because the bill 
released all Indians, despite their varying levels of 
adjustment to life in mainstream society. The former 
commissioner defended the existing practice of competency 
tests for citizenship to determine who was best suited for 
separation from federal protective status.38
Joseph Choate also testified before the Senate about his 
opposition to the Lane Bill. He claimed that under its 
provisions the Indian Service would no longer have the 
protection against unscrupulous employees that it now enjoyed 
with the use of civil service requirements. He noted that 
this bill was just a more radical form of the Johnson Bill, 
and he held firmly to the idea of granting citizenship on an 
individual basis rather than enacting a blanket policy.
Choate also supported the individualization program that 
Sells had proposed as the best method for releasing the wards 
from government control. He compared the Johnson and Lane 
Bills by concluding that "the chief difference [was] that one 
[was] retail and the other [was] wholesale d e s t r u c t i o n . " ^
Carlos Montezuma, a full-blood Yavapai Apache and member 
of the Society of American Indians, had attacked Sells and 
the Indian Bureau for its paternalistic policies even before 
these two bills came before Congress. In 1914, he advocated 
that all Indians be freed from government control. Education
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alone, Montezuma claimed, would ultimately free the Indian 
from his constrained life. He likewise advocated the end of 
the reservation system and the Indian Bureau because 
reservations made residents into dependent people, and the 
Indian Bureau only accentuated the differences between Native 
Americans and whites which slowed the assimilation process. 
Similarly, he asserted that Indians were being allotted land 
unfairly by the Bureau because of the misperception that 
Native Americans did not have the ability to use large 
allotments of land efficiently. Montezuma suggested that 
racial justifications motivated the Bureau’s adherence to the 
reservation system, and he asserted that this type of 
treatment would not have occurred if it had involved a 
different racial or ethnic group.^
Charles Chickeney, a member of the Society of American 
Indians, agreed with Montezuma that this paternalistic policy 
did not help Indians. He charged the Indian Bureau with 
being a menace that "ignore[d] freedom and blight[ed] all 
ambition."4! Montezuma continued his attacks and told 
Secretary Lane that he should end the ward system and allow 
Indians to develop the land they already had to the best of 
their abilities. He also reminded Native Americans that the 
Indian Bureau would not always be available to them, and 
thus, they should take their lives into their own hands and 
become self- sufficient. He called the Indian Bureau and its 
ward system "leeches [that] suck the blood of the I n d i a n . " 4 ^
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In the end, the Lane Bill failed to pass the Senate, 
despite support from some persons seeking immediate freedom 
for Native Americans. However, the stated intention of 
Secretary Lane and Commissioner Sells continued to be the 
gradual dissolution of the Indian Bureau and release of all 
Indians into mainstream society after being armed with full 
citizenship. Obviously, these two bills did not follow the 
same timetable that the secretary and commissioner had 
envi sioned.
The supervision and discipline of Indian Bureau 
employees under Sells truly left something to be desired. He 
tried to bring together an agency whose employees were spread 
all over the country, at a time when communications were 
tortuous. To accomplish this, he adopted a policy based on 
the theory that the least amount of conflict would result in 
the most harmonious situation and the greatest number of 
benefits to Indians. Unfortunately, Sells did not achieve 
much harmony because of his tendency to transfer repudiated 
Bureau employees. This evasive policy therefore damaged 
Sells’ credibility with many of the more influential Indian 
reform groups, including the Indian Rights Association.
Many accusations concerning misbehavior by Bureau 
employees were never proven to be true. Yet, the constant 
flood of innuendo, whether true or not, helped shape the 
image of the Indian Bureau and Commissioner Sells. Most 
reformers agreed that the solution was not to eliminate the
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Indian Bureau or even to reduce its power, but rather to 
install honest employees to manage the nation's wards until 
they were ready for citizenship. Despite their differences 
over the role of the Indian Bureau, Sells and Montezuma 
agreed that education was a key to Indian liberation and 
assimilation into white society. That subject became the 
next battleground among reformers and the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs.
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CHAPTER THREE: EDUCATION POLICY AND REFORM
Richard H. Pratt bluntly expressed the general opinion 
among educators and legislators by declaring in 1915: "Don't
feed America to the Indian, which is a tribalizing and not an 
Americanizing process; but feed the Indian to America, and 
America will do the assimilating and annihilate the 
p r o b l e m . Y e t ,  the educational debate had come through a 
long and tortuous path before reaching that level of 
consensus in the early twentieth century. Since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the federal government 
had attempted to provide financial support for Native 
American education, but this effort had always fallen short 
of the necessary levels. After the Civil War, the need for 
Indian education dramatically increased as more Indians were 
placed on reservations and expected to make cultural 
transformations. The federal government made major strides 
to meet the demand for these schools, but the greatest 
contribution came from independent groups, often missionary 
societies which established their own schools on or near 
reservations.^
In the late nineteenth century, many Americans believed 
that the American way of life was the best system in the 
world. Generally, those reformers held their culture above 
the rest of the world, including other sub-cultures within 
the United States such as Native Americans. By the 1870s,
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reformers almost uniformly believed that a highly structured 
educational system was the primary means of attaining 
complete assimilation of these diverse peoples. With this 
goal in mind, Captain Pratt dramatically redirected federal 
funding toward government schools when he founded the 
Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania in 1879. Within two 
decades, twenty-five off-reservation schools had been opened 
with the help of federal monies.^
By the time of Cato Sells' administration, the Indian 
education system had developed four different types of 
schools. First, the industrial, off-reservation boarding 
school such as Carlisle became popular, especially among 
those Indians who were already considered more "civilized." 
These Indians were thought of as more willing and financially 
able to send their children away to learn white customs. 
Second, reservation day schools were developed to keep 
children at home. These schools appealed to the more 
traditional Indians because they did not like to send their 
children away, and this system allowed children to help tend 
the land with their parents. Third, the public schools near 
Indian reservations offered students a place to become 
directly integrated into white society. Many critics of 
boarding schools predicted that the segregation of white and 
Indian students would not last much longer because better 
acculturation occurred when Indians and whites were educated 
together.^
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The last type of school was the mission school. Even 
though relatively few Indians sent their children to these 
types of institutions by the early twentieth century, they 
did remain popular on some reservations. A bitter conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants had arisen after the Civil 
War when almost all of the Indian agencies were assigned to 
Protestants. By the time of Sells' administration, however, 
Catholics had established an educational role for themselves 
through the Bureau of Catholic Missions, which was especially 
well represented in the Southwest and California.^
With this varied approach to Indian education, few 
Indian children were left without some type of educational 
opportunity. Yet, by the early twentieth century, the Indian 
Bureau and federal government wanted to dissolve the mix of 
federal boarding schools and reservation day schools, and to 
encourage Indians to attend public institutions. This 
supposedly would further the assimilation process, as well as 
save the government money. Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Sells encouraged white settlers to move near Indian 
reservations and establish public schools that would be open 
to both Indian and white students. He believed that this 
would help gradually eliminate the reservation system as a 
concern for the federal government.6
Despite his committment to expansion of public schools, 
Sells also became committed to making boarding schools into 
manual training institutions, and placing graduates into
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mainstream factories to show that Indians could be just as 
industrially proficient as whites. The commissioner directed 
Indian education away from the purely academic fields toward 
more practical, hands-on training that would give Indians the 
knowledge they needed to compete in the white world.^
Commissioner Sells'- general theory of reform focused on 
individualization, or detribalization, and his plan for 
education adhered to this theory as well. He wanted to bring 
Indian education to a level equal with white curriculum so 
that Native Americans could find economic security and 
relieve his office of some financial burdens. Discussion 
about education centered on regulations, funding programs, 
the role of moral instruction, the purposes of industrial 
training, the role of returned students, and opportunites in 
higher education. Predictably, each of these issues sparked 
debate from a variety of reformist sources.
Sells outlined a uniform plan for government boarding 
schools early in his tenure. He required 217 days of school 
a year for each Indian, and class size would range from 
twenty-five to forty students. In 1913, there were seventy- 
six reservation boarding schools, with between 75 and 400 
students enrolled in each. Furthermore, the federal 
government paid the tuition of Five Civilized Tribes' 
students at thirty-five off-reservation schools, forty-five 
public schools, and over 325 public schools in Oklahoma.®
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With the government responsible for all of these 
institutions, Sells worked to place additional Indians in 
public schools rather than in the more expensive boarding 
schools. Similarly, Sells pushed to have Indian public 
school students pay their own tuition if their parents were 
able. He felt that this would alleviate unnecessary 
government expenditures, and place responsibility on Native 
American families who could feel more pride in their 
accomplishments. In 1917, Sells proposed the transfer of all 
Indian pupils from government schools who could afford to pay 
the tuition at a public school. With this new policy in 
place, the number of Indians in public schools increased by 
157% between 1913 and 1917.9 Sells viewed this dramatic 
increase as a benefit because public schools would keep 
Indian children at home to help their parents work respective 
land allotments. Also, this would teach the younger 
generation "white ways," which, in turn, would speed the 
dissolution of the reservation system.^
The Board of Indian Commissioners supported Sells' new 
program for financing schools, but they also illuminated a 
number of disturbing inadequacies in the educational system. 
First, many of the smaller public schools were understaffed 
and lacked vital equipment. Second, and more alarming, the 
Board noted that only 60% of the eligible Indian students in 
Oklahoma attended school, while 72% of all eligible children 
in the United States were enrolled. Oklahoma, though, was
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not the worst case. The Navajo Reservation, stretching 
across northern New Mexico and. Arizona, only recorded a 28% 
attendance rate among the eligible population. The Board 
called on Sells to encourage education among all tribes, but 
especially on the Navajo Reservation where the traditional 
beliefs often conflicted with the white-oriented 
curriculum. 11-
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane encouraged 
Sells to "free" Indians from government schools and to put 
them on their own resources as soon as possible. He 
supported freeing those Indians who already had an education 
from government protection, while keeping uneducated Indians 
under government protection for the immediate time. Lane 
claimed that this would create two classes of Indians, and 
the change would have a positive effect because the protected 
class would have proper role models to emulate.1^
In more heated terms, F.B. Riggs expressed his disgust 
over the misuse of government schools by Indians. He felt 
that free government schools hurt Native Americans because 
they coddled this group and made them more dependent. Riggs 
also disagreed with Lane about the role of government 
schools. Lane wanted to use them in a limited way, but Riggs 
felt that it was unfair for the government to operate these 
schools in competetion with public and private institutions. 
Yet, curiously, Riggs did endorse the concept of separate 
Indian schools because he felt that Indians could not
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effectively compete in white schools. He noted that during 
the previous century there had been little increase in the 
number of Indians attaining higher academic training. In 
response to this reality, Riggs wanted to discontinue all 
academic training and focus efforts on industrial training.^ 
Problems arose concerning the availability of 
educational facilities for all Indian children. In an 
editorial for the American Indian Magazine, the anonymous 
author noted that the Sioux in South Dakota were required to 
have compulsory education by an 1862 act of Congress. Yet, 
in order to maintain their schools over the years, they had 
to sell much of their tribal land. Even with the 
availability of this money, the facilities still fell short 
of Sioux needs by excluding about 700 students for want of 
space. This contributed to a high illiteracy rate of well 
over 40% for the children of the tribe. Sells vowed to 
correct this problem by raising the educational facilities 
for the Sioux to equal the rest of the nation by 1 9 2 5 . 
Similarly, H.B. Peairs, of the Lake Mohonk Conference, 
pointed out many areas that lacked proper facilities in his 
address in 1913. He claimed that there were at least 10,000 
Indian children, mostly in remote areas, who had no chance 
for education. He also proposed that the Indian Bureau and 
the federal government provide schools for about 7,000 
"defective” children across the country because he felt that 
this was the best means of achieving eventual assimilation.
7 6
In an article for the Quarterly Journal of the Society 
of American Indians, later known as the American Indian 
Magazine. Frank G. Speck, professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania, protested against Indian Bureau employees 
because they knew about Indians, but did not know Indians.
He opposed Sells' new education plan which had won the 
support of most people involved in Indian matters. Speck 
accused the Indian Bureau of educating Indians to destroy 
their own culture, which he thought would leave Indians 
without any identity as just another "darkman" in America. 
Speck claimed that whites had once admired Indian culture, 
but after Native Americans became an apparent impediment to 
progress, this admiration faded, and the process of 
deculturization began. He advocated that instead of 
educating Indians to become more like whites, whites should 
be educated to appreciate the cultural distinctiveness of 
Native Americans.^
Unfortunately, Speck expressed the minority opinion on 
Indian education at that time. Most Bureau employees and 
reformers advocated the -placement of the majority of Indians 
into white schools to quickly assimilate and make "productive 
citizens" out of them. This progressive zeal affected every 
aspect of Indian education, but probably the most striking 
result was the outcry for more moral education among Indians.
Sells believed that the primary mission of Indian 
education was to create "right-thinking, productive
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citizens," a process which placed special emphasis on moral 
instruction. He insisted that teachers not only teach moral 
values in the classroom, but also teach by example in the way 
they conducted their public and private lives.17 Yet, the 
commissioner received numerous reports from the Indian Rights 
Association about immoral behavior among teachers and 
students. Soon after Sells took office in 1913, charges of 
immorality surfaced at the Carlisle Indian School. Antoine 
DeNomio, a student at the institution, described the 
situation as quite poor. Laura Kellogg, another student, 
supported her classmate and charged Superintendent Moses 
Friedman with being the source of this improper behavior.
The superintendent denied these charges and claimed he 
possessed a high moral character. Later in that same year, 
charges of alcohol abuse and many runaway students flooded 
Sells' office from the same institution. Indian Rights 
Association investigator Matthew K. Sniffen charged that the 
students were at fault in this case. They did not show 
proper respect toward Friedman because they called him "a 
dirty Jew," which was probably the source of the problem.^ 
Sells found Friedman innocent of the charges, but encouraged 
him and other Carlisle employees to instill better morality 
in their students.
Many Indian schools took steps to control behavior, 
including the banning of student dances which, by 1917, 
caused a backlash among some government officials. These
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observers felt that dances added a necessary socializing 
element to the educational experience. Reverend Robert D. 
Hall, editor of the Y.M.C.A. Bulletin, disagreed in the pages 
of Indian's Friend, where he protested against dancing 
because it encouraged immoral behavior. He compared dancing 
to the issuance of cigars once a week. All week long 
students were drilled with lessons on proper behavior, but on 
a weekend night this was contradicted, which he felt sent 
mixed messages to Native Americans.^
Samuel Brosius, of the Indian Rights Association, also 
reported a number of student behavior problems at the 
Carlisle School in late 1913. Two students were arrested and 
charged with fornication. The local authorities wanted to 
jail the couple, but fornication was only a misdemeanor, 
carrying a maximum of a $100 fine, which both received. 
Brosius urged Sells to investigate the problems at Carlisle, 
especially those involving the girls of the school. He 
claimed that many female students wandered away unattended, 
used intoxicants, and had a general lack of discipline. When 
the commissioner investigated these charges, he determined 
that Friedman was a competent employee, that this moral 
depravity had originated earlier in the Indian students' 
homes, and that their future educational experience at 
Carlisle would correct the problem.20
Late that same year, Milton Fairchild, Director of 
Instruction at the National Institution for Moral Instruction
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in Baltimore, addressed the Carlisle students and staff about 
the importance of moral education for Indians. He did not 
define Indians as a unique group that needed special lessons, 
but rather he included Indians among the general American 
population to stress the importance of uniform guidelines. 
Fairchild believed that moral education would be more 
beneficial to Indians than any other educational approach.
He delivered the same speech at the Haskell Institute, in 
Kansas, which he claimed possessed a better quality of 
student. Earlier, he had found the students at Carlisle to 
be inattentive, but, overall, he praised the 
"Americanization*' work at Carlisle. ^ 1
Fairchild agreed with many other education reformers 
that the keys to the success of Indian education were the 
teachers and the methods they employed. He claimed that the 
best way to teach proper behavior was not by lecturing, but 
by working closely with children in their everyday lives and 
showing didactic lessons through common daily activities, 
rather than through some grand theory. For this to be 
effective, Fairchild believed, teachers had to have the 
proper moral training themselves.^  Reformers called for 
more careful selection of teachers because the focus of 
schools had moved away from academic subjects to a moral 
emphasis. Likewise, the main goal of students was to enliven 
a new spirit for education among their tribes since most 
Indian parents had failed to instill these values. Emma
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Tooker wrote to the Indian School Journal that Indian parents 
allegedly had become too busy to teach their own children 
proper manners, so the schools had to assume this 
responsibility.2 3
Teachers also adopted new methods for teaching Indians. 
They concentrated more effort on instructing children in a 
way that would encourage their natural abilities, rather than 
forcing students to fit a mold. Grace M. Jackson asserted 
that close observation of Indian children would provide a way 
to understand the unique interests of each child. She 
claimed that play-time was one of the best ways to see what 
each child liked to do, because play was merely an imitation 
of life. Sells supported this individualistic approach to 
education and stressed the importance of religious tolerance 
among his teachers.^
Charles W. McGilberry and James Smith, both prize- 
winning student writers, asserted in the Quarterly Journal of 
the Society of American Indians that moral education among 
Indians would not only make better Indians, but a better 
nation. With a formal education, Indians would become 
responsible citizens, but also not until t h e n . 25 Yet, Emma 
Johnson Goulette, a Pottowatomie from Shawnee, Oklahoma, 
charged some Indian Bureau employees with continued racism, 
which made it even more difficult for Native Americans to 
succeed. She asserted that Indians were expected to behave 
and perform better than whites merely to be considered equal.
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She protested this attitude, and advocated more industrial 
and vocational training for Indians so that they could 
compete fairly within the larger society.^6
The Word Carrier published a story by Indian student
Lucy Ruillard on what Indian school meant to her. She was in
the seventh grade and had been in school for five years. She
loved the experience and claimed that all of her classmates 
felt the same way. She studied history, art, arithmetic, and 
agriculture, but her favorite activities were basketball and 
gardening. In the end, she asserted that the best thing 
about attending an Indian school was the fact that she 
learned more about Christianity.^ ^ Sells and many other 
government officials saw her as a proper example of what 
Indian students should b e .
To supplement the commissioner’s commitment to 
traditional academic and moral instruction, many reformers 
advocated more manual training courses. Arthur C . Parker, a 
member of the Seneca tribe and the Society of American 
Indians, called for uniform productivity whereby Indians and 
others had to adapt to the changing industrial world. He 
claimed that the old classical education was static and would 
not make Indians into good farmers or factory workers. He 
stressed the difference between industrial and vocational 
training, and urged schools to adopt a program for both. 
Parker claimed that industrial education concentrated on a 
general knowledge of all industries, while vocational
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training developed a specialized skill. Yet, Parker did not 
believe that all academic training should be eliminated. 
Rather, he proposed teaching enough traditional subject 
matter to make Indians efficient workers and moral citizens. 
Inhancing immediate job prospects, however, became the real 
concern for Parker.28
Henry Roe Cloud, a Winnebago and member of the Society 
of American Indians, agreed with Parker that unless education 
was useful to a person's "head, heart, and hand," it was 
useless. He advocated that all students should utilize the 
best of their abilities, whether vocational or academic, 
regardless of the resistance expressed by traditional parents 
who were skeptical about the value of white education.28 
H.B. Peairs also recognized the value of vocational 
education, and he believed the high drop-out rate could be 
cured by increasing vocational training to better prepare 
students for the real world. In 1916, Peairs wanted Indian 
students to attend white schools, and he adopted the slogan, 
"every Indian child in some school within five years."30 His 
dream, however, was not realized. Similarly, James Buchanan 
wrote in the Indian School Journal that Indian students 
should be trained in areas where they had a special interest. 
He also lamented that many students had the wrong ideas about 
service to their community. Service should be something 
pleasurable, he argued.31
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By 1916, Sells had outlined his plan to switch Indian 
education away from the traditional academic emphasis to more 
industrial and vocational instruction. He believed that the 
purpose of Indian schools was to create: "not the perfect
farmer or the perfect housewife, but the development of 
character and sufficient industrial efficiency to enable the 
returned boy or girl to derive happiness and comfort from a 
home created by individual efforts."^
The commissioner used this concept as the basis on which 
to draft a course of study for Indian schools which were 
divided into primary, pre-vocational and vocational courses. 
The primary division included the first three grades and it 
emphasized industrial and vocational work even in the first 
grade. About half of the class time in day schools was 
dedicated to industrial and occupational study, while at 
boarding schools even more time was spent in these areas.
For the second grade, in day schools, the amount of time 
remained the same, but for boarding schools the emphasis 
shifted to industrial work which was to occupy about two- 
thirds of the day. The time distribution remained the same 
for the third grade in both day and boarding schools.^
The pre-vocational division included the fourth through 
sixth grades. At the boarding schools, purely academic 
subjects were reduced to about one hour per day in the fourth 
grade, while the vocational activities greatly increased.
The fifth and sixth grades were also designed this way, with
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the additional allotment of over five hours per day for 
vocational studies. Other courses receiving more attention 
in this division were personal behavior, sanitation and 
hygiene. This division tried to prepare Indians for general 
work and to be good citizens because many students did not 
advance educationally beyond this p o i n t . ^4
The vocational division included a four year program.
The first year dedicated all but one hour of the day to the 
industrial studies. The second through fourth years were 
much the same. This final division was designed to prepare 
Indians for a specific vocational skill. Sells believed that 
this new program would train Indians for a specific job and 
make them productive citizens.^
The result of this new industrial plan was government- 
sponsored factories in Shiprock, New Mexico and Defiance, 
Arizona where Navajos only had to pay between $1,000 and 
$2,000 to have each facility built on their reservation.
This guaranteed jobs and investment in an area that sorely 
lacked both. On the Moqui Reservation, an area previously 
hostile toward education, the Hopi schools experienced more 
enthusiastic attendence because of the new industrial 
program.3 6
While most of the vocational and industrial training 
focused on young boys, girls were instructed how to become 
housekeepers. Sells believed that if Indian girls became 
good housekeepers for their farmer-husbands, the home life
85
would be more stable. Model cottages were built at many 
schools to train girls in cooking, cleaning, personal hygiene 
and other domestic activities.^  Similarly, some of the 
Santee Sioux girls in Nebraska began their cooking 
instructions in the third and fourth grades. They also 
studied nutrition for feeding the sick. Lois C. Leech wrote 
to the Word Carrier complaining about how these hardworking 
girls did not get proper credit for their efforts of 
producing more than 1 0 0  loaves of bread per d a y . ^ 8
Probably the most profound accomplishment for boys 
involved in industrial training' came at Pennsylvania's 
Carlisle Indian School. This school sent John Gillman, a 
Chippewa from Minnesota, to Detroit, Michigan to work as an 
intern for the Ford Motor Company. Here he was introduced to 
the automobile manufacturing business, and within a few 
months he set the factory record for car assembly by shaving 
ten minutes off the old production time of three hours. The 
Ford Motor Company credited his general education and 
vocat ional training at Carlisle for his success at the 
factory. Gillman1s accomplishment opened opportunities for 
many other Native American interns to go into Ford and other 
factories to get practical training for their vocations.
Ford officials noted that these Indian students performed 
their jobs as well as any white student. This new 
involvement in the car industry likewise opened employment 
opportunities after graduation
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During Sells' administration, Indians attained better 
access to basic education and manual training for industrial 
jobs, but some emphasis was also shifting to the feasibility 
of higher education. The goal of educating Indians was to 
have as many graduates as possible return to their homes and 
help bring along "civilization." The returned students were 
supposed to symbolize the best of white society so that the 
rest of the tribe would follow their example. However, the 
issue of returned students became more of an irritant than a 
help during Sells' term. The Word Carrier asked the key 
question about the success or failure of Indian education. 
Indians went to distant schools and learned the ways of white 
society, but then returned to their reservations to try to 
help improve them. If a returned student failed to do this, 
according to the periodical, Indian education was termed a 
failure.1 Yet, for white education, this standard did not 
apply.^0
The Board of Indian Commissioners alleged that there 
were few failures among returned students, a point which 
contradicted many other reports. The Board noted that white 
prejudice and lack of job opportunities on reservations were 
the primary reasons for 'failure. Furthermore, many of the 
traditional Indians did not accept the educated Indians back 
into the community. Most of the jobs on reservation were of 
an agricultural nature which seemed to exclude those who had 
an academic or vocational training.41
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The main problem came from the more traditional members 
of the reservations who were hostile toward white education 
and the alien values which it proscribed. So the graduates 
reentered a foreign and often hostile environment when they 
returned to the reservations and tried to bring about 
changes. The leaders of the reservation and graduates alike 
did not know what role the latter were to play. This 
hostility and jealousy left the returnees as outsiders to 
their own people, at the very time that overt racism and 
cultural misunderstanding limited their opportunities in 
broader, mainstream s o c i e t y . ^2
Other reformist periodicals documented cases of returned 
students who failed to perform as expected. They were called 
lazy and backwards. The Board therefore called on the 
government to regulate more closely the activities of the 
returned students. Yet, other Indian graduates returned to 
reservations and assumed successful vocations. The Word 
Carrier noted the activities of many Santee graduates. Among 
the most numerous occupations were missionaries, 
housekeepers, interpreters, merchants and pastors.
Furthermore, many graduates sought some form of higher 
education.^3
Robert D. Hall, of the Society of American Indians, 
outlined a plan to make the returned students more 
disciplined and effective in their communities. He 
emphasized cooperation between schools, tribes and
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government. He also called for the most promising Indian 
students to attend so they could serve their people by 
reducing the friction between tribal factions and between the 
tribe and the government
Indians and reformers alike recognized that many Indians 
performed well not only in industrial training, but also in 
academic fields. They questioned the availability of higher 
education possibilities for successful students. Joseph M. 
Brunnett, a Menominee student, noted that Indians needed to 
be educated equally in order to stand alone and escape the 
dependency cycle. He believed that rather than returning to 
the problems of the reservation, the best students should go 
to college and find jobs in mainstream society. He called on 
colleges to open their doors to Native Americans so that they 
could prove their worth.^
Another question arose about whether or not Indians were 
capable of performing well in higher education. Bertram 
Bluesky admitted that not all Indians were capable of college 
work, but neither were all whites. He felt that the 
brightest Indians should seek a college education in order to 
compete, and their successful example would encourage others 
to f o l l o w . Fred Bender, a Chippewa, emphasized four areas 
of higher education that would benefit Indians. First, 
higher education would emphasize the study of classic works 
of literature which would develop problem-solving skills. 
Second, this type of education would give Indians a broader
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view of life. Third, education would give Indians an "equal 
footing" for competition with whites. And last, higher 
education would give Indians a deeper understanding of 
religion.  ^^
The Progressive Era witnessed an increase in the number 
of Native Americans who were entering colleges around the 
nation, and, in 1914, the Word Carrier noted that thirty 
Indians were enrolled at the University of Oklahoma alone. 
These students formed an organization called the "Indian 
Students 1 Club" which celebrated Native American culture 
while also serving as a recruiting tool to attract additional 
Native Americans. Because the students came from numerous 
tribes such as the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Cherokees, Delawares 
and Shawnees, they were able to recruit students from a 
multitude of r e s e r v a t i o n s E d w a r d  R. Rogers, a Chippewa, 
became famous among Indians and whites across the nation for 
his educational achievements. He graduated from Carlisle 
School and enrolled at the University of Minnesota where he 
became a football star. After college, he pursued a law 
degree and began to practice law in Walden, Minnesota where 
he took on the duties of the chief of the Chippewa Tribe in 
Minnesota.^  ^
Education became one of the top priorities for Sells.
He acknowledged that Indians needed to be educated and, yet, 
he believed that purely academic training would not benefit 
Native Americans in the long run. The commissioner and other
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reformers agreed that Indians had little use for a purely 
classical education when they returned to a rural reservation 
in the western United States where the dominant occupation 
was agriculture. Sells tried to correct this problem with 
his new industrial and vocational program for education. He 
felt that practical training would make educated Indians more 
productive in society because they had a marketable skill.
In this new program, though, Sells did retain a certain 
amount of academic and moral training to ensure the shaping 
of well-rounded and moral citizens. Sells 1 plan was to make 
Native Americans a part of white society quickly and to 
detribalize them as well. He felt that the ultimate goal of 
Indian education was to Americanize Indians and gradually 
phase the Bureau of Indian Affairs out of the education 
bus ines s .  ^^
Frank Speck offered a different point of view that did 
not fit the "progressive spirit" of his era. He proposed 
that Indian life should be treated as a unique cultural 
entity that should be preserved and partially emulated by 
white culture instead of destroyed. Unfortunately, Speck's 
voice was not heard by the overwhelming majority of reformers 
who continued pushing Native Americans to become a part of 
mainstream society. The integrationist philosophy 
transcended the issue of education and carried over to the 
hotly debated topic of health care during the same era.
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INDIAN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 1912-1922 
BIA SCHOOLS
YEAR____________ BOARDING ____________________ DAY
NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
1912 17,924 39 6, 417 14
1917 22,200 35 6, 558 10
1922 18,674 29 5, 548 9
YEAR____________ PUBLIC SCHOOLS__________________ OTHER SCHOOLS
NUMBER PERCENT__________________ NUMBER PERCENT
1912 17,Oil 37 4,779 10
1917 29,173 46 5, 837 9
1922 34,301 53 6, 420 10
Source: Paul Stuart, Nations within a Nation: Historical
Statistics of American Indians (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1987), p. 167.
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CHAPTER FOUR: HEALTH CARE AND THE INTOXICANTS DEBATE
Indian health care became closely associated with 
Indian education during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. As school enrollments climbed, the 
frequency of regular health examinations for children also 
increased. However, the closer contact between pupils 
helped breed communicable diseases. In the late nineteenth 
century, tuberculosis especially ravaged the Indian 
population, and the general response from the Indian Bureau 
was an admission that little could be done with the dreaded 
disease. Not until Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis 
Leupp1s administration of 1905-1909, did the treatment of 
tuberculosis become an Indian Bureau priority. Leupp 
estimated, from limited medical examinations, that about
40,000 out of more than 300,000 Indians in the United 
States were stricken with tuberculosis. Although Leupp 
channeled efforts in the right direction, they proved to be 
insufficient for a problem of this magnitude.1
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells continued 
the attack on disease begun by his predecessors, but the 
overall health condition improved little. Sells urged 
Congress to increase appropriations for Indian health care 
from $200,000 in 1914, to $350,000 in 1917. He believed 
that healthy Indians could provide for themselves, and 
without proper health care they would continue their
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dependence on the government. He felt that the Indian 
Bureau and the Indian Medical Service were making great 
strides toward eradicating some of the more serious 
diseases among Indians, but World War I interrupted this 
progress by taking numerous employees to serve in the war 
and leaving the Indian Bureau short of employees.^
Eradicating disease was not the only concern that the 
commissioner had for Indian health. Intoxicants, mainly 
alcohol and peyote, attracted the attention of Sells, 
reformers and Congress. With the rising fervor for 
national prohibition, intoxicants became an easy target for 
many "progressive" reformers. Alcohol and peyote were 
considered by many to be a health danger, as well as a 
moral concern. Prohibitionists claimed that the use of 
these drugs would lead to a wide variety of mental and 
physical ailments. Likewise, the commissioner tried to 
address other health concerns that faced Indians in the 
early twentieth century, including the structure of the 
Indian medical service and the massive epidemic of 
trachoma.
The Indian Bureau organized a health care force that 
included regular physicians, contract physicians, nurses 
and field matrons. The regular physicians were doctors who 
were employed full-time by the Indian Bureau. The contract 
physicians were doctors who lived near reservations and 
were hired on a short term basis to provide health care as
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the need arose. The nurses and field matrons were usually 
women who attended to the less serious health concerns and 
instructed Indian women in hygienic and domestic skills to 
provide a suitable environment for their families. Of all 
of these positions, probably the most significant was the 
field matron because she visited all of the reservation 
homes on a regular basis.
Elsie E. Newton, Supervisor of Field Matrons, 
encouraged the matrons to systemize their visitation 
schedules to ensure that all Indian homes were covered. 
Sanitation became one of the key concerns for this group of 
health care providers as they encouraged preventive 
medicine. They believed that if Indians maintained clean 
homes, disease would be reduced substantially. One 
formidable foe opposing the work of the field matron, 
according to Newton, was the Indian "medicine man." She 
claimed that once the field matron would leave an Indian 
home, the medicine man would reverse all of her work.
Newton asserted that it was the duty of matrons to be 
humble and persistent to help bring these dependent people 
into mainstream society.^
The Indian School Journal published reports of field 
matrons from all over the country beginning in 1913 and 
continuing on a monthly basis until 1916. These reports 
provided Indians with a useful source of information about 
health care, as well as a convenient platform for the
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exchange of ideas between matrons. Sanitation and personal 
hygiene dominated each month's publication. Eva L. Carey, 
a field matron on the Lower Brule Reservation of South 
Dakota, told of her success with clean bedding and clothes 
as a deterent to tuberculosis.  ^ Other matrons encouraged 
Indian women to keep their ovens clean in order to cook 
food properly, and to maintain cookbooks as records of how 
to prepare nutritious food. The United States Public 
Health Service built model houses in many areas to teach 
women how to keep a good house and how to prevent disease 
from invading their homes.5 Sells recognized poor 
sanitation as a major obstacle to a healthy Indian 
population. In 1914, consistent with the advice of field 
matrons, he advocated better lighting, ventilation, and 
sanitary conditions to help improve health. He also 
initiated lectures in schools to promote personal 
cleanliness. In addition, Sells closely monitored schools 
to prevent the outbreak of epidemics.^
Joseph A. Murphy, Medical Supervisor of the United 
States Indian Medical Service, drew a direct connection 
between the poor sanitary conditions in Indian homes and 
the contraction of trachoma and tuberculosis. He claimed 
that improper disposal of refuse contributed to 
tuberculosis, while tainted water supplies provided the 
primary cause of trachoma. He also believed that among 
less "civilized" tribes, the higher the incidence of
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disease. Similarly, nurse Estaiene M. DePectquestangue 
wrote in the Quarterly Journal of the Society of American 
Indians, that trachoma and tuberculosis had reached 
epidemic proportions on many reservations, pushing the 
death rate to double that of most white populations. In 
the end, DePectquestangue urged Sells to build more 
hospitals and shift resources to Indian health care 
issues.7
In 1919, the Board of Indian Commissioners recommended 
changes in the organization of the medical service. In the 
past, epidemics had spread across Indian reservations 
without eliciting much response from outside communities. 
The Board wanted statistics on all epidemics made public, 
and death rates among Native Americans placed in the 
permanent records of the Surgeon General of the United 
States. These reform ideas came as a response to the loss 
of many vital health employees during the war who 
previously had maintained these types of records. The 
Board tried to make medical services more efficient by 
suggesting these guidelines and by removing the Indian 
Medical Service from the supervision of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and placing it under the authority of the 
United States Public Health Service.®
Sells recognized the urgent need for more hospitals 
for Native Americans. In 1914, he noted that there were 
fifty-one hospitals that served 1,432 patients, and six
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more under construction. Even without proper medical 
facilities, Sells noted that over 67,000 Indians had been 
examined out of a general population of 200,000, which 
excluded the populous Five Civilized Tribes. More than
8,000 cases of tuberculosis and almost 14,000 cases of 
trachoma were reported among those examined. Sells 
estimated that among these 200,000 Native Americans, there 
were at least 22,000 cases of tuberculosis and about 35,000 
cases of trachoma. This alarming disease rate prompted the 
commissioner to petition Congress for more money to build 
hospitals.  ^ Disease became so rampant for Indian 
populations in the Midwest that a sanitarium was opened in 
Toledo, Iowa to serve that region, and most of its patients 
were treated for trachoma. Sells1 efforts toward increased 
funding paid off because, by 1916, there were seventy-four 
hospitals in operation that could treat over 2,000 
patients. Unfortunately these institutions merely treated 
the consequences rather than the causes of the diseases.^  
The periodical Indian1s Friend published a series of 
reports for several years beginning in 1913 which depicted 
events at the hospital on the Navajo Reservation in New 
Mexico and Arizona. The hospital was built in late 1912 
and opened by the new year. It was known among the 
reservation dwellers as "Kin-bi-jo-ba-i," which meant "the 
house in which they are kind." The English name for the 
hospital was the Good Samaritan Hospital. Initially, the
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hospital only served two patients because of the difficulty 
that officials had in competing with the influence of the 
"medicine men." In the spring of 1913, more opposition 
surfaced from medicine men because they felt their role in 
the tribe was being challenged by white interlopers. The 
magazine also noted that even though the hospital structure 
was completely finished, the staff still lacked adequate 
equipment . ^
In 1914, hospital authorities contended that the 
interference of a medicine man had caused a child to die. 
The boy had been brought to the hospital for treatment, but 
almost no visible improvement had occurred. The father of 
the child had been told by a medicine man that his son was 
cursed because just before the boy had been born, a sister 
had died of a snake bite. The medicine man convinced the 
father that the only possible cure was for him to chant 
over the child. Having seen no improvement in the white 
hospital, the father took the child to the medicine man for 
this ritual which allegedly resulted in the death of the 
child and the frustration of hospital officials. According 
to tribal tradition, when a death occurred, the remaining 
children had to sleep outside of the hogan, and this, in 
turn caused even more illness. Hospital officials thus 
clashed head on with Navajo views of holistic medicine that 
distrusts modern germ theories of disease.^
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Despite these early problems, the cases served by the 
hospital dramatically increased as the summer of 1913 
approached. Sixty-six patients were housed in the 
facility, and employees gave out 1,538 treatments in the 
field for a wide range of ailments. Unfortunately, this 
dramatic increase depleted the already inadequate hospital 
supplies and funds. In the November issue of Indian's 
Friend, the hospital asked for at least $1,500 from readers 
to keep the facility open. At the end of the first two 
years, the hospital had served over 100 patients and had 
issued more than 3,800 treatments, mostly for tuberculosis 
and trachoma. In this same space of time, a full-time 
doctor had arrived and travelled to nearly every home on 
the reservation. Howeve.r, hard winters slowed the doctor’s 
visits and somewhat diminished his home treatment programs. 
Ironically, as the hospital expanded its case load, its 
economic viability became more suspect, and every issue of 
the periodical for these two years asked readers for money 
to keep the hospital doors open. Despite added 
congressional appropriations, private donations were needed 
because building costs and the demands on health care had 
exceeded expectations.
Without a doubt, tuberculosis and trachoma were the 
most common and devastating Indian ailments. In 1916, Dr. 
Charles A. Eastman, a Santee Sioux, estimated that at least
70,000 Indians had trachoma and about 30,000 had
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tuberculosis. He claimed that the sedentary life imposed 
upon Native Americans caused most of the health problems. 
Their ancestors had once lived a nomadic life and many of 
their customs were still consistent with that lifestyle. 
After they became more settled, their diet radically 
changed for the worse and their customs did not fit the new 
situation of reservation life.1^
The Board of Indian Commissioners noted in 1920 the 
desperate situation among Oklahoma Indians in their battle 
with tuberculosis. The Board agreed with Superintendent 
Gabe E. Parker of Oklahoma that more aid was needed 
immediately in this area. However, little action was taken 
on health issues because the primary concern of government 
officials was the Oklahoma Indians1 gas, oil, and land 
rights. The state of Oklahoma eventually took steps to 
help, but the federal government and Sells moved very 
slowly.1®
The tuberculosis problem was not centered in one part 
of the country. Lily A. Shields, a nurse from California, 
rode in a carriage all over rural parts of the state to 
help tuberculosis sufferers. She worked for the Red Cross 
and petitioned Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane 
to provide more money for her trips into the remote areas. 
Lane quickly provided the extra money required for these 
humanitarian efforts. The Indian’s Friend, however, 
cynically pointed out that Shields’ greatest concern was
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the protection of white people because she knew that in the 
summer months Indians would leave their homes to pick fruit 
which would put them into direct contact with whites.^
On the other side of the country in New York, 
tuberculosis ravaged Indian populations to at least the 
same degree as in Oklahoma and California. A report in the 
January 24, 1913 New York Times illuminated poor health
conditions in the state labor camps. The laborers who 
built canals and state highways had one of the worst health 
ratings. Dr. A.C. Hill .and Dr. J.M. Strong of the State 
Charities Aid Association noted that one-third of Indian 
laborers had tuberculosis which quickly spread due to 
excessive heat and unsanitary spitting habits. Indian 
medicine men were present in the camps, but the doctors 
were convinced that these men provided little material 
help. Hill and Strong urged the State Board of Health to 
intervene and bring the problem under control by providing 
more doctors for the camps. Likewise, they affirmed that 
tuberculosis spread easily, especially where close contact 
between people occurred. Crowded homes and schools that 
had poor ventilation and were unsanitary provided prime 
breeding-places for this disease. As a result, much of the 
Indian population was afflicted with this ailment and the 
death rate was about twice that of the white population. 
Although, trachoma was more common than tuberculosis, 
blindness, rather than death, was the usual result.
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Trachoma, also known as "sore eyes," atta-cked a 
person's vision gradually, and Sells recognized it to be a 
personal tragedy as well as a major obstacle to Indian 
self-sufficiency. On the average, about 20% of school 
children were afflicted with the disease, but as the age 
increased, so did the frequency of the disease. Sells 
attacked the problem in the schools where he had a captive 
audience. He sent medical people to educational 
institutions to examine children and give treatments.^
Yet, among the older generations, who were generally 
hostile to white medicine, the trachoma rate ranged from 
60% to 85%, depending on the area of the country. This 
disease was particularly common among the Five Civlized 
Tribes in Oklahoma.^
John W. Duke, Commissioner of the Oklahoma State Board 
of Health, noted that about one-half of the victims of this 
disease became blind. With such an impairment, the 
Indian's "economic usefulness decreased" by about 50%.
Duke believed that a few precautions could help prevent the 
spread of this disease. He advocated fresh air, sunshine, 
and exercise for all patients. Also, Duke suggested that 
individuals keep their bodies as clean as possible and not 
sleep with an infected person. Duke asserted that these 
precautions and frequent visits to the doctor at the first 
sign of sore eyes would reduce the number of blindness 
cases. He also believed that the disease originated in the
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Middle East and Slavic areas of Europe and had been brought 
to the United States by immigrants. Appropriately, he 
urged close monitoring of Indian servicemen in Europe to 
ensure that they did not become infected and bring the 
disease back with them.20
Although, Sells contended that his administration had 
brought trachoma under control by 1920 among school 
children, he admitted that the disease continued to ravage 
the older generations who often refused medical attention. 
The simple truth was that tuberculosis and trachoma had 
plagued Indians for many years before Sells arrived in the 
Indian Office, and they would persist at epidemic rates for 
many years beyond his tenure.
During Sells' term as commissioner, an outbreak of 
influenza also struck Indian and white populations 
nationwide. Duke noted that at least one-third of the 
Indian population in Oklahoma was afflicted with influenza 
in 1916 and it was a highly contagious strain. This 
incident of influenza in Oklahoma occurred about two years 
before the national epidemic. Sells noted in his 1919 
annual report that the Public Health Service had turned 
virtually all of its attention to this national emergency. 
Ironically, the Chilocco Indian School in Oklahoma was 
spared and did not encounter one case of influenza in 1918. 
However, the Navajos in New Mexico and Arizona were not as 
lucky, and were among hardest hit by this scourge.21
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The Indian's Friend noted that the medical 
superintendent, Mrs. Johnston, and her daughters had some 
success fighting the disease among the Navajos. 
Unfortunately, M r s . Johnston and her daughters caught the 
disease and were bed-ridden for an extended period of time. 
During that time, she petitioned Sells to send help, but 
none came, thus leaving many sick Navajos unattended. 
Johnston and her daughters recovered and returned to their 
work, and, according to this periodical, instilled a faith 
in modern medicine and the Christian spirit in the Navajos, 
despite the inaction of the Indian B u r e a u . 22
Although Sells was slow to react to the plight of the 
Navajos, he did take steps to prevent diseases before they 
became widespread. He started a "Save the Baby" campaign 
to help reduce the high rate of infant mortality which 
claimed the lives of three-fifths of Indian children under 
the age of five. The commissioner made this a top priority 
by calling on Bureau employees to instruct Native Americans 
on how to clean and cook properly for b a b i e s . 23 Mrs. O.H. 
Lipps, wife of the editor of the Indian School Journal, 
urged Sells to help babies before they were born by 
instructing pregnant women on how to care for them. She 
urged Indian mothers to nurse their children for at least 
three months and to avoid bottle feeding if possible.24 
Sells recognized this problem and he organized meetings on 
reservations to instruct women on how to care for babies
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and why they should go to hospitals to give birth. More 
significantly, he believed that Indian health care should 
be rated as a higher priority than either education or the 
allotment of land.25
As another measure of preventive medicine, the 
commissioner endorsed a program of proper dental care to 
keep diseases from being transmitted. Joseph A. Murphy, 
Medical Supervisor of the United States Indian Medical 
Service, claimed that dirty teeth and mouths carried germs 
throughout the rest of the body. Furthermore, this was the 
main avenue for tuberculosis to move through the body, 
according to Murphy. He asserted that chewing food 
thoroughly would keep it out of the teeth and help prevent 
decay. Also frequent brushing of teeth and tongue would 
kill about 90% of the germs in the mouth. He urged more 
dental care for Indians to help reduce tooth decay and the 
spread of disease, but Sells continued dental programs that 
were already in place and made no significant c h a n g e s . 2 6 
One of Sells' pet programs was the "Swat the Fly" 
campaign, which encouraged Native Americans to kill flies 
and to keep their reservations free of areas that might 
breed them. According to H.U. Goltry of Oklahoma A&M 
College, flies transmitted tuberculosis and trachoma. In a 
warm summer season as many as fourteen generations of flies 
could be born and die. In just four generations, Goltry 
believed, over thirty-three billion flies would be born
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nationwide. These flies carried filth that was infected 
with diseases. Goltry and Sells encouraged Indians to keep 
their garbage areas tidy and to remove any stagnant pools 
of water to prevent the breeding of flies. As a further 
precaution, the commissioner suggested using traps and fly 
paper.27
Above all things, Sells was concerned with the death 
rate among Native Americans. Most estimates placed the 
Indian death rate at thirty deaths for every 1,000 people, 
or about double the white death rate. Milton Friedman, 
Superintendent of the Carlisle Indian School, charged that 
the death rate was too high and the Bureau should take 
steps to improve it. He claimed that from his experience 
at least 30% of Indian deaths were traceable to 
tuberculosis. Sells and F.W. Broughton, of the Statistics 
Division of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, refuted the idea 
that the Indian death rate was higher than the birth rate. 
Broughton pointed out that in 1890 there were 243,000 
Indians, in 1900 there were 270,000, and in 1910 there were 
more than 300,000 Native Americans. Sells and Broughton 
claimed that Indians were not a dying race, but were 
actually increasing their numbers.28
Sells vowed at the 1915 Lake Mohonk Conference to rid 
the Indian community of alcohol, and pledged that he would 
not touch a drop of liquor as commissioner so as to set a 
proper example for Native Americans and Bureau employees.
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The commissioner petitioned Congress to increase 
appropriations for the policing of the liquor traffic among 
Indians from $100,000 to $150,000 a year. He claimed that 
alcohol was a demoralizing force in Indians 1 lives that 
rendered the user incapable of becoming a productive part 
of mainstream society. But as early as 1913, Sells had 
noted that there were 1,000 arrests for illegal liquor 
possession on reservations, resulting in about a 50% 
conviction rate. Alluding to these statistics, he felt 
that progress was being made.29
By the end of Sells' first term in office, over 5,500 
people had been arrested for transporting or selling liquor 
to Indians, and over a half million pints of alcohol had 
been seized. Congress had paternalisticly determined 
several years before that Indians were a dependent people 
who needed federal protection from alcohol. Over time, 
many allotted Native Americans became citizens, but 
Congress still restricted their use of alcohol as long as 
they lived on reservations. In Oklahoma, where illegal 
sales was common, bootleggers would load large trucks full 
of liquor, quickly drive into reservations to make the 
sale, and just as quickly disappear. The State of Oklahoma 
decided to seize all vehicles involved in this type of 
activity to help slow down the flow of liquor, but the 
profits of such an illicit enterprise were so great that 
the flow could not be entirely stopped.20
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During Sells' administration, many reports of 
demoralized and physically injured Indians flooded 
periodicals and the Indian Bureau as a result of alcohol 
abuse. A.F. MacColl, a former Bureau employee, noted a 
severe case of alcohol abuse in 1914. He claimed that a 
full-blood Ute committed suicide after drinking large 
quantities of whiskey. MacColl had heard reports of liquor 
traffic on the Unitah Reservation, and declared that these 
criminals "ought to be hanged."31 Other cases were not as 
severe, but still received attention from Matthew K.
Sniffen of the Indian Rights Association. He claimed that 
Henry Bear, formerly of Winnebago, Nebraska, received the 
money for his allotment of land and moved to Philadelphia 
where he had wasted most of his money on alcohol. Sniffen 
pleaded with Sells to find some way to restrict Bear's 
ability to obtain alcohol. The commissioner found that 
because Bear was a citizen, self-supporting, and living 
outside of a reservation, the Indian Bureau had no 
jurisdiction over him and could not i n t e r f e r e . ^2
The Indian Rights Association uncovered many cases of 
moral depravity allegedly caused by alcohol abuse. In 
1920, Samuel Brosius, a field agent for the Indian Rights 
Association, told of two young Indian women from Standing 
Rock Reservation in North Dakota who travelled to a fair in 
South Dakota where they met a group of young Indian men and 
became intoxicated. The men took the women into the
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countryside where, Brosius claimed, the women were "grossly 
outraged" by the young men. Once the women returned to 
their reservation, they were arrested for intoxication.
The father of one of the women called on local officials to 
find the men who had assaulted his daughter and bring them 
to justice. He claimed that he had obeyed the government
for over thirty years and it was time the government
returned the favor. However, the next day the father 
inexplicably denied that the entire incident had ever 
happened, and swore that his daughter and the other young 
woman were good and virtuous women who never had consumed 
alcohol. Once this story reached Sells' office, the 
commissioner believed the father and nothing more ever came 
of it. 33 True to his usual form, Sells tried to keep 
conflict to a minimum in his administration and he
certainly never went looking for additional problems if he
could avoid them.
Many periodicals pointed out that not only were 
government officials and reformers outraged about alcohol 
abuse, but so were Native Americans. An Indian named Two 
Leggens wrote to Sells to ask him to shut down the saloons 
in his area. He believed that these places hurt the moral 
and physical health of Indians. Two Leggens claimed that 
many Bureau employees drank alcohol excessively which 
resulted in immoral behavior. He desperately pleaded with 
Sells by asking him whether there were "no sober men in the
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United States that you can send to show us how to live."34 
Likewise, over 700 Sioux protested in Mitchell, South 
Dakota against liquor traffic. This conference to denounce 
"fire water" attracted Indians from North and South Dakota
and Nebraska.35
Alcohol at schools became a controversial issue as 
weli. In an article in Indian's Friend, the anonymous 
author used Lizzie Allen, a student at Carlisle, as an 
example of how students ought to feel about liquor. Allen 
claimed that hospitals housed many drunks of low moral
character and deadened senses. She likewise contended that
the money wasted on alcohol could be used for food and 
education, and she believed that most of the younger 
generation favored p r o h i b i t  i o n .36 However, Supervisor O.H. 
Lipps and Dr. W.A. Hutchinson, of the Cumberland County No- 
License League, disagreed by using Carlisle as an example 
of a school with a severe alcohol problem. Carlisle had a 
good academic program, but the liquor flowed so freely that
Lipps and Hutchinson called on the people of the town and
school to put an end to the problem. They also claimed 
that this did not happen at the Haskell Institute in Kansas 
because the state had outlawed alcohol in 1 9 1 5 . 3 7
Congress restricted the sale of alcohol to Indians in 
January of 1910, but little enforcement of the law 
followed. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States was adopted in 1919, and it prohibited
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"the transportation or importation into any state, 
territory, or possession of the United States for delivery 
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
the laws t h e r e o f . T h i s  amendment placed a blanket 
restriction on whites and Indians alike. Yet, many states 
had taken earlier steps to make their states dry before 
national prohibition, which helped bring about this 
national amendment.
By 1917, Arizona had become a dry state which,
Indian’s Friend happily noted, left more money for food and 
family necessities, as well as a reduction in crime and 
expense for maintaining prisons. The city of Phoenix 
reduced its police force from twenty-three to seventeen 
officers and saved $20,000 in the first six months of 
prohibition. In all of Arizona’s major cities, crime was 
reduced by about one half in just the first year of 
p r o h i b i t i o n . 3  ^ Sells pointed out that from 1913 to 1919, 
liquor traffic had been significantly reduced, partly 
because of his efforts, but mainly because states like 
Arizona went dry before the national legislation took 
effect. By 1916, the commissioner felt satisfied enough 
with the statistical progress to reduce the annual 
appropriations needed to curb liquor traffic from $150,000 
to $100,000, and in 1921 to $65,000.^0
Sells encouraged education about the evils of alcohol 
use, and he hailed state prohibition movements as a sign
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that all people, not just Indians, recognized alcohol as a 
plague that needed to be stopped. By 1916/ Nebraska, 
Oregon, Washington and Idaho had gone dry, and Oklahoma had 
claimed a major victory over the liquor traffic. W.J. 
Creekmore was arrested, convicted, sentenced to three years 
in prison, and fined $2,200 for selling more than 
$1,000,000 worth of liquor in Oklahoma alone. He was known 
as the "king of liquor" and, in many ways, he controlled 
the state. Sells took these examples as signs of progress 
toward a healthier Indian population that could be quickly 
moved into mainstream society.^
Yet, there were opponents of these restrictions, such 
as Mrs. Dorcas J. Spencer of California who disagreed with 
Sells' whole philosophy of prohibiting alcohol for Indians. 
She believed that singling out Indians to prevent alcohol 
abuse violated their rights, especially those who were 
already citizens. She supported the national prohibition 
movement, but found that singling out one group or another 
was fundamentally wrong. Instead, she declared that the 
Eighteenth Amendment was the first fair piece of national 
legislation that treated Native Americans as equals to all
other people.^2
Alcohol, though, was not the only intoxicant that 
concerned Sells, diverse reformers, and members of 
Congress. All of them found the restrictions on peyote to 
be much more difficult to enforce than those laws against
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alcohol. General Richard H. Pratt, founder of Carlisle 
Indian School, advocated a Russian-like czar to force 
people to quit peyote use. But the issue was blurred by 
the religious context of peyote use and the contention of 
many that it was not addictive. Peyote was a part of the 
mescal cactus which was very common in Mexico and southern 
Texas. The cactus "buttons" were consumed by eating or 
smoking, which kept it out of the liquor category in the 
eyes of the law. In a court case on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation of South Dakota, Richard Black Bear had been 
convicted of intoxication by peyote, but the decision was 
overturned by a higher court because peyote did not qualify 
as a l i q u o r . ^3 Findings like this frustrated Sells and 
made it difficult to restrict peyote use.
Representative Harry L. Gandy of South Dakota pledged 
to prohibit peyote use among Indians. He introduced 
legislation in 1915 to carefully limit its use, and this 
attracted a lot of support from Sells and the reformers. 
Gandy charged that in theory peyote was used for religious 
purposes, but in reality it just provided a means for 
immorality. Gandy outlined many of the negative effects of 
this drug. It allegedly caused muscular depression, sound 
distortion, impaired vision, hallucinations, lengthening of 
time, and was just as habit-forming as alcohol.^
The major obstacles to restricting peyote came from 
its widespread use as a medicine and as a part of religious
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ceremonies for the Native American Church. Ardent 
assimilationist Reverend Lyman Abbott asserted in 1917 that 
peyote was not really the sacrament of a true religion, as 
practitioners claimed, because it only caused 
hallucinations and excited sexual passions. He called 
peyote a "dry whiskey" and doubted its benefits as a 
medicine because he believed that it did not cure 
alcoholism, but, merely switched dependencies.^
Harry Black Bear, of South Dakota’s Pine Ridge 
Reservation, was arrested for being intoxicated from 
peyote, but the case could not be prosecuted effectively 
because Black Bear claimed that he used the drug for a 
religious ceremony. This same defense of the drug kept 
Gandy's bill from passing which would have restricted the 
use of the drug. Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, a chemist, claimed 
that this peyote cult was not true Christianity because it 
was a drug-induced religion and therefore peyote should be 
restricted. Supporters of peyote use claimed that it was 
not a drug, but a natural part of the world because it was 
not manufactured by man. In addition, these supporters 
claimed they only used peyote in a fashion similar to the 
wine used in Christian communion. Wiley was outraged by 
the comparison and declared that this was a drug-induced 
cult and it should be prohibited.^6
The Society of American Indians submitted an article 
to the Word Carrier in 1914 describing peyote and its
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spiritual uses, but did not take a side in this furious 
debate. However, the Board of Indian Commissioners were 
less tolerant as they condemned it outright as a harmful 
drug that was dragging Indians into debauchery. Five years 
later, the Oklahoma Secretary of State issued a charter to 
a group representing numerous tribes for the founding of 
the Native American Church that would practice Christian 
beliefs with peyote as the primary sacrament. This legal 
action enraged practically everyone within the Indian 
office and the various reform groups, and prompted appeals 
to Congress for legislation that would outlaw peyote and 
not just restrict it.47
Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, associated with the Bureau of 
Food Sanitation and Health, declared that peyote was 
consumed like food, but did not qualify as such because it 
had no nutritional value. He warned against the creation 
of peyote churches because they could lead to future 
authorization of alcohol, opium and cocaine churches. 
Gertrude Seymour wrote to the Indian School Journal that 
peyote use was not a religion, but a dangerous drug habit 
that corrupted many Indians. Robert Hall, of the Society 
of American Indians, agreed with Seymour that the drug was 
harmful and at a conference of the "Friends of the Indian," 
he demanded outright p r o h i b i t i o n . 48
Despite the efforts of Sells, numerous reformers, and 
especially South Dakota Representative Harry L. Gandy,
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peyote was not restricted during the commissioner's eight 
years in office. The debate raged well on into the 
twentieth century centering on two main issues. First, 
peyote did not qualify as an intoxicating liquor since it 
was a bean and not a liquid. Second, and more important, 
with the emergence of the Native American Church, the issue 
of religious freedom dominated the debate. Members of the 
church asserted that they used peyote the same way 
Christians used wine as the sacrament. Sells was unable to 
solve this complex problem or satisfy the outspoken 
proponents of both sides of the debate.
Health care, in general, improved little under Sells. 
He tried to increase the numbers of medical service 
employees in the field, but World War I demands for 
manpower seriously compromised his efforts. Likewise, the 
tuberculosis and trachoma epidemics which gripped the 
Native American population at the inception of his office 
holding showed no sign of abating. He increased funding, 
built more hospitals, and provided more education about 
health and sanitation topics, but a much larger national 
effort was needed to make a dent in these widespread 
problems. On a positive note, Sells did bring trachoma 
under control in Indian schools with the use of quick 
diagnosis and treatment.
Alcohol use was a bigger issue for Sells. He entered 
the office condemning its use among Indians and generally
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supporting national prohibition. He did not have much 
difficulty removing alcohol from the Indian population 
because the sentiment of the country favored national 
prohibition. Contrastingly, peyote became the most 
controversial health subject of the entire administration 
and its final resolution would not come until the 1970s 
with a series of court decisions recognizing the validity 
of peyote use by members of the Native American Church. 
Just as World War I took many medical employees away from 
Indian service, it also called many Native Americans to 
duty which would create a larger national debate about 
citizenship for Indians. This issue occupied much of 
Sells' attention during the remaining years of his tenure.
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH EMPLOYEES, 
INDIAN SERVICE, 1911-1921
YEAR HOSPITALS CAPACITY PHYSICIANS NURSES HOSPITAL FIELD
_______OPERATED (BF.DS )_______________________ EMPLOYEES MATRONS
1911 50 1, 268 NR NR NR NR
1916 81 2, 283 NR NR NR NR
1921 85 NR 168 99 155 75
Source: Paul Stuart, Nations within a Nation: Historical
Statsitics of American Indians (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1987), p. 102.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MILITARY SERVICE AND THE CITIZENSHIP ISSUE
Throughout the late nineteenth century, Indians played 
a major role as scouts in the United States Army. Scouts 
were used as guides in areas that were unfamiliar to the 
army officers. Many Indians became scouts to learn the ways 
of white people gradually rather than beng forced to accept 
an entirely new culture all at once. Both the army and the 
Indian scouts benefited from this cooperation. While 
Indians were exposed slowly to a new culture in which they 
would eventually have to assimilate, the army received 
guidance in unfamiliar areas, as well as necessary 
auxiliaries for battle.
In 1891, John M. Schofield, commanding general of the 
army, and Secretary of War Redfield Proctor began a project 
that integrated Indian soldiers into regular army regiments. 
Unfortunately, within six years, the plan to produce all- 
Indian companies had failed, mainly because of prejudice on 
the part of army officers who were unwilling to work with 
Native Americans. Prejudice continued to plague Indians in 
their efforts to become regular members of military 
regiments. In the two years prior to the American 
involvement in World War I, little military preparation 
occurred except in Arizona where Indian boarding school 
graduates were organized into separate units in the Arizona 
National Guard. This philosophy, however, conflicted with
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the ideas of Secretary of War Newton Baker and Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Cato Sells who opposed similar units for 
the regular army.2
From its inception, the debate centered on whether 
Indian volunteers could enlist in all-Indian units or 
whether they would be integrated as individuals within the 
white regiments. Noted educator and military officer 
Richard Henry Pratt had supported the idea of segregated 
units during the 1890s because he felt that Native Americans 
could adjust to rigid military life more easily when 
surrounded by fellow Indians rather than when surrounded by 
racist white soldiers. Yet, by the beginning of World War 
I, Pratt had changed his views and agreed with Sells and 
Baker that the only way to quickly assimilate Indians into 
mainstream society was to fully integrate them into military 
units.3 As the war approached, this became the dominating 
sentiment among reformers and government officials alike. 
Sells’ program to assimilate Indians included integrated 
military units and eventual citizenship for all Native 
Americans. Unlike during Redfield Proctor's experiment of 
the 1890s, the media strongly supported Indian efforts 
during World War I and often glamorized their achievements. 
Thus, during the final four years of Sells' administration, 
the wartime conduct of Indian soldiers, homefront 
contributions from reservations, and the ultimate issue of
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citizenship dominated much of the commissioner's time and 
energy.
When European powers went to war in August of 1914, the 
United States decided to remain officially neutral by 
adhering to its traditional isolationist policy. Canada, 
however, joined the Allies in support of Great Britain, and 
immediately dispatched large numbers of soldiers to France, 
including Native American volunteers from both Canada and 
the United States. Canada organized segregated units around 
the Six Nations of the Iroquois, as well as accepting entire 
companies from other tribes. The Canadian military's 
allowance of Indians to handle their own units without the 
autocratic sentiment that was evident in the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, delighted the Word Carrier in 1915, and 
offered Indians a chance to prove their loyalty and 
leadership qualities.4 This type of enthusiasm by Indians 
for performing their patriotic duty impressed Sells.
Numerous periodicals, including Indian's Friend, Indian 
School Journal, and the Quarterly Journal of the Society of 
American Indians, continuously editorialized about the 
profound loyalty exhibited by Native Americans in their 
eagerness to defend democracy and their country. Gawasa 
Wanneh, a Seneca, asserted that the time was right for 
whites and Indians to come together to fight a common enemy. 
For many decades, the two had battled one another, but now 
Congress had a duty to allow Indians to take part in the
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defense of their own country, and not to forget the role 
that Indian soldiers had played throughout American 
history.3
Sells recognized the historic role that Native 
Americans had played in the military, and, by 1917, had 
implemented a draft policy for Indians. Only those between 
the ages of twenty-one and thirty who were citizens were 
eligible for the draft. Sells relied on registration lists 
from superintendents of reservations for the pool of 
eligible men. Non-citizens, Sells ruled, should be 
evaluated on an individual basis if they were willing to 
serve as volunteers. The commissioner was favorably 
impressed by the positive spirit in which Indians 
volunteered to serve their country. He viewed Native 
American servicemen as acculturating agents who, like their 
earlier boarding school counterparts, would return to the 
reservations and become its new generation of leaders. By 
war's end, he estimated .that at least 10, 000 Indians had 
served in the United States military and these veterans had 
gained credibility with the public, opportunity for future 
military service, familiarity with English, inspiration for 
education, and a more energetic spririt for seeking 
s u c c e s s .  ^ Chauncey Yellow Robe agreed with Sells' 
conclusions in an address to the Society of American Indians 
in Pierre, South Dakota. Yellow Robe claimed that Indians
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were true patriots, and that military service was the best 
way to Americanize both Indians and immigrants.7
The American allies in Europe also thought highly of 
the Indians in regular military units. They contended that 
the Indians were eager to fight the "barbarianism" of the 
German monarchy and return humanity to Europe. Some 
Europeans were puzzled, though, about the enthusiasm of the 
Native Americans in light of newspaper reports of the heated 
debates and conflicts over the rights of Indians in the 
United States. Many Europeans saw this as a contradiction 
for Indians to defend their country while their rights at 
home were in question. The American Indian Magazine claimed 
that Europeans did not understand the nature of American 
political debate which encouraged lively discussion in order 
to formulate acceptable policy.8
Despite this possible contradiction, Native Americans 
volunteered in extraordinary numbers for military service. 
The Menominees from Wisconsin were a relatively small tribe 
that voted to support President Woodrow Wilson's declaration 
of war against Germany in 1917, and they sent one hundred of 
their 1,730 members to fight. Sells estimated that among 
all of the Indians who joined the military, eighty-five 
percent were volunteers. He also noted that schools 
especially helped in filling the country's military ranks. 
The commissioner estimated that about fifteen percent (60) 
of the boys at the Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania
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had registered for the military. In addition, by 1918, at 
least seventeen men from Virginia’s Hampton Institute had 
registered. Warren K. Morehead likewise noted in the New 
York Times that several hundred students and graduates of 
the Haskell Institute in Kansas had registered for the 
service, surpassing all other schools in the number of 
volunteers. The Board of Indian Commissioners therefore 
encouraged the building of rifle ranges at Indian schools to 
supplement the wide range of military instruction already 
received by all male students.9
The magazine Indian's Friend noted an ironic case near 
Bullhead, South Dakota. Seven Sioux volunteered for service 
at this small town which was near where the hated General 
George A. Custer had once served as an army officer. The 
periodical viewed these volunteers as a sign of progress and 
an exhibition of the true spirit of patriotism. The Indian 
School Journal published a report of the first Indian worker 
to quit his job in a factory to join the service. John C. 
Alexander, a full-blood Choctaw, quit his job in Wichita, 
Kansas to join the army. He saw this as a once-in-a- 
lifetime opportunity to serve his country. Alexander's 
celebrated case was followed by at least 160 Indian 
resignations from Wichita factories to join the a r m y . ^
As the war continued, both European allies and American 
soldiers told stories of the bravery of Native Americans in 
the service. Sells spoke so highly of Indian servicemen in
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his 1919 annual report that he compared their abilities to 
the gods of mythology.11 Obvious exaggeration, though, did 
not deter journals and newspapers from illuminating Indians 1 
achievements in a more accurate manner.
In a 1918 article in Indian's Friend, the anonymous 
author asserted that Native Americans were extremely useful 
as scouts to find the enemy's concealed location. Corporal 
Walter Snow, a twenty-four year old full-blood Sioux and 
member of the 122nd Infantry Division, also known as Chief 
Little Drop, killed two German soldiers of the four who 
tried to ambush his unit's camp. The other two German 
soldiers retreated in fear, and Snow became a hero. Many 
magazines played up the stereotypical image that Germans so 
feared the "barbarians" from America that they sometimes 
fled in panic. Nonetheless, Snow was rewarded for his 
efforts with the Croix de Guerre.12
Many periodicals emphasized what they called the 
"natural abilities" of Indians to be consumate warriors. 
Frequently they focused on the alleged innate skill of 
Indians to move silently across "no-man's land" and into the 
enemy camp. This stereotypical talent was attributed to 
their natural familiarity with nature and their decades of. 
experience in fighting guerilla-style in the American 
forests, deserts and on the Plains. One such "super­
warrior" was Charlie Rogers, a full-blood Sioux from 
Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota and a member of
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the 18th Infantry Division, who scared twenty German 
soldiers away because of his "war-whooping" as the battle 
began.13 Although intended as laudatory praise, such media 
exaggeration stressed the old image of warrior over 
assimilated citizen, and this one-dimensional image worried 
some reformers who were looking for a non-martial role for 
the Indian after World War I .
Despite inaccuracies and exaggerations, the work of 
Indians in the military was extraordinary. Two gained 
special distinction beyond the rest. Joseph Oklahombi, a 
Cherokee, captured 171 German soldiers and took control of 
their system of machine-gun nests, in a scene reminiscent of 
Sergeant Alvin York's well-known accomplishments. Secretary 
of the Interior Franklin K. Lane applauded his special brand 
of heroism and Marshal Henri Petain pinned Oklahombi's Croix 
de Guerre. Otis W. Leader, a Choctaw from Calvin, Oklahoma, 
captured two machine-gun nests and took eighteen enemy 
prisoners. Once he returned from battle, he underwent 
treatment for exposure to mustard gas. Based upon this 
exceptional accomplishment, a leading French artist selected 
Leader as the "typical" American soldier on which to base 
his famous portrait which hangs in the War Museum in 
Paris.14 Ironically, this French artist chose an Indian to 
represent all American soldiers, and this helped support 
Sells' philosophy advocating the integration of Native 
Americans into white military units.
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Herbert Welsh, of the Indian Rights Association, 
claimed that the greatest benefit of the war for Indians was 
their association with white people which would speed 
assimilation. Nearly all reformers and Sells agreed that 
Indians should join regular military forces and not be 
segregated into Indian-only units. Sells felt that this 
would show "unity" in order to rescue the "old world from 
medievalism," and also prevent discrimination. However, in 
Nebraska, well before the United States declared war, some 
Winnebagos formed their own companies to prepare for war. 
Sells and other reformers did not support this action, but 
did applaud their initiative and dedication to the 
protection of their country.13
Sells opposed separate units for Indians because he 
felt that it would slow their assimilation into white 
society. While he claimed that Indian soldiers were equal 
to whites, Sells and the military both supported the 
maintenence of four separate, all-black regiments which had 
been organized immediately following the Civil War. Neither 
Sells nor the ranking military officers could explain this 
obvious contradiction in the two types of social 
experiments. In the end, the commissioner claimed that the 
Indian volunteer rate was well over 85% of those eligible 
for service, which surpassed all other ethnic groups. He 
also reported no incidents of resistance to military 
service, even from the most tradition-bound of tribes and
134
those that had been at war with the United States only three 
decades earlier.^
However, the New York Times and the Indian School 
Journal recorded a number of incidents of Indian resistance 
to the war effort. Clara Root, an Arapaho student at the 
Chilocco School in Oklahoma, expressed her disgust over the 
war. As a pacifist,she declared that the only way to settle 
disputes was by arbitration. She also believed that if all 
countries disarmed then arbitration would be the only 
alternative. Root pointed out the contradiction between a 
court system of arbitration and the martial actions of 
government. In court cases, arbitration and compromise were 
the rule, and violence and force were condemned, but 
governments were not required to adhere to these rules.
This student wondered how people could respect the law or 
the government as long as these contradictions existed.
Root also noted the terrible financial burden that war 
placed on each country. She believed that the money from 
the war could have been spent on education and health care 
for all Americans. World War I cost the United States 97 
billion dollars, according to Root, which was twelve times 
the cost of the Civil War. She concluded that when disputes 
were settled by force, only hatred resulted.17
Root's prophetic statements were echoed by Tom McNeal, 
a writer for the Oklahoma Farmer. McNeal disagreed with the 
war, but he more fervently attacked the notion that
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mandatory military training should be imposed. While 
supporters of the draft claimed that this would make good, 
strong men and prevent the United States from being caught 
unprepared again, McNeal argued that this was false. He 
claimed the intention of such military training was to make 
consciousless killers out of young men. McNeal further 
asserted that military training for American young men was 
contradictory to the purpose of the present war. After all, 
the American intention was to destroy the militarized power 
of Germany and to restore peace, not to replicate the same 
brand of militarism.18
While relatively few Indians opposed the war on moral 
grounds, many did protest the draft registration process 
which was poorly explained by government officials. In June 
of 1917, a protest against draft registration by Ute Indians 
in Ignacio, Colorado ended with all but eleven of the 
Indians ultimately registering. Sheriff John Alexander sent 
a posse to return the eleven men who had refused to 
cooperate. Those who opposed registration did so because 
they thought that they were going to be sent to fight 
immediately in France. Once this misunderstanding was 
resolved, nearly all submitted to the process.19 Exactly 
one year later, Henryetta, Oklahoma erupted in chaos. More 
than 250 Creek Indians reportedly revolted against military 
service, armed themselves, and moved into the nearby hills. 
Only fifteen of the sixty-five called to register followed
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instructions to return and submit to federal authority. An 
unnamed woman from nearby Council Hill supposedly had been 
spreading propaganda against the American government and its 
involvement in the war. She allegedly convinced this large 
group of Indians to revolt, and planned to organize a secret 
society to oppose the government and its war effort.29 The 
story proved to be greatly exaggerated and the resentment 
rested more upon previous government land fraud toward the 
Creeks than it did upon wartime issues.
Despite isolated pockets of resistance, wartime dissent 
among Indians was never significant. Sells estimated that 
about 10,000 Indians were in the military service out of 
only about 33,000 who were eligible for the draft. Various 
means of support also came from those at home who were not 
eligible for the military. By 1918, Sells noted that more 
than 10,000 Indian memberships in the Red Cross had been 
purchased, especially among the tribes of Oklahoma. Just 
one year after Sells' report, the New York Times reported 
over 20,000 Indian memberships in the Red Cross, and one 
auction by the Omaha Tribe raised more than $2,000 for this 
relief organization. Many Indians could not afford to 
donate money, so they donated time and effort in knitting 
sessions and letter-writing campaigns sponsored by the Red 
Cros s .21
Probably the most profound homefront effort among 
Indians was the purchasing of Liberty Bonds. Sells asserted
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that in the second issue of the bonds, Indians purchased 
almost $4.5 million worth, and in the third issue, they 
purchased a similar amount. On the fourth issue, Indians 
purchased well over $4.5 million of bonds. This averaged 
out to be more than $50 per Native American nationwide, and 
the total investment easily exceeded $20, 000, 000.22 Many 
examples of generous gifts came from Oklahoma where some 
oil-rich tribes such as the Osage lived. Yet, even the 
poorer Odanah tribe in Wisconsin contributed more than 
$200,000 in Liberty Bonds, which was a generous output from 
this small group.^3
Commissioner Sells and the New York Times proudly 
reported the most generous purchase of Liberty Bonds by a 
single Indian. Jackson Barnett, a Creek from Oklahoma, 
earned $50,000 per month from his oil-rich allotment, but 
was still considered incompetent because the wealth did not 
change his traditional lifestyle. Barnett claimed that he 
only needed $50 per month on which to live. He invested, 
through his guardian, over $800,000 in Liberty Bonds and 
gave more than $50,000 to the Red Cross, asserting that the 
money would just remain idle otherwise. Sells and many 
others praised Barnett for his generosity and patriotic 
s u p p o r t . 24 Unfortunately, much of the money placed in war 
bonds came from tribal investment funds which the federal 
government manipulated without tribal approval or input.
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A movement began in 1917 at the highest federal level 
to draft Indians into service as farmers. Sells called on 
Gabe E. Parker, a superintendent in Oklahoma, to organize 
the effort to bring together 30,000 Indians to increase 
agricultural output to feed the war-ravaged European 
countries. Some Indians in California preceded Sells in 
this effort and increased their agricultural production a 
year earlier to help in the "white man’s war."25 The 
cultivation of land by Indians increased by over 30% between 
1915 and 1916, from 358,796 acres to 472,156 acres. By 
1918, over 750,000 acres had been plowed by Indians for 
wartime food production, but Sells and other government 
officials, while praising Native American efforts, turned to 
leasing Indian land to whites as a way of increasing 
productivity and appeasing white agricultural interests.26
While Indians in the military and at home poured a lot 
of money, time and blood into the wartime effort, their 
patriotic endeavors reopened the old debate about the 
correct timing for citizenship legislation. Many people 
felt that since Indians had been so helpful to their nation 
in its moment of trial, they deserved to become citizens 
right away. Others, like Sells, held a more conservative 
view.
The citizenship debate for Indians began well before 
Cato Sells took office in 1913. Some reformers had wanted 
to grant citizenship outright to all Indians, just as they
139
had to former slaves after the Civil War. However, 
citizenship for Native Americans was a more complicated 
issue because of their complex individual and tribal 
property holdings. Many assumed that the 1868 Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution granted 
citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States. But it did not include non-taxed Indians who 
retained their tribal affiliations as quasi-independent 
nations, as well as their unique treaty-based relationship 
with the federal government.27
The 1887 Dawes Severalty Act gave Native Americans the 
first opportunity for citizenship which was speeded up by 
the 1906 Burke Act. These measures were encouraged by white 
land speculators who were eager to settle sections of the 
western United States. Once Native Americans were declared 
competent, they were free of government protection and were 
able to handle their land allotments as they chose. This 
proved to be devastating for most Native Americans as each 
succeeding commissioner hastened the process of releasing 
Indians form federal control, and more land passed into 
white hands. Even though Sells encouraged the speedy 
granting of citizenship through the awarding of land 
patents, he opposed the rapid pace which some reformers 
advocated. Indian patriotism at home and in Europe during 
the war again sparked a heated debate on this subject.^8
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In sympathy with Sells T position, former President 
Theodore Roosevelt asserted that Indians needed to be freed, 
but not too quickly or too slowly. He urged the Indian 
Bureau to find the proper balance, and predicted that only 
about half of the Indians would make a successful transition 
to mainstream society at that time. In typical 
paternalistic fashion, Roosevelt believed that to turn an 
adult Indian loose outright would be comparable to requiring 
an eight-year-old white boy to support himself. He 
concluded therefore that the acculturation process could 
take more than a generation to complete.^9 jn most ways, 
Sells agreed with Roosevelt. The commissioner opposed a 
blanket policy for citizenship that would release all 
Indians into full citizenship. He claimed that "untutored" 
Indians and those with more than one-half Indian blood 
should remain under government protection. Sells asserted, 
though, that even those who were released and became 
citizens should be granted a five acre plot of land that was 
protected as a safety measure in case they failed in 
mainstream society. Sells' paternalistic policy found a 
favorable audience with other government o f f i c i a l s . 3 0
The Board of Indian Commissioners supported Sells' more 
conservative approach to Indian liberation. This group 
claimed that they supported the freeing of Indians as 
quickly as possible, except for those with more than one- 
half Indian blood. For those Native Americans, individual
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analysis of their competency was required. The Board used 
statistics to support their position. Over 70% of Indians 
had more than one-half Indian blood, excluding the Five 
Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma which were more thoroughly 
intermarried with non-Indians. Yet even in the latter's 
case, 50% had more than half Indian blood. Among the 
Indians supervised by the Indian Bureau, excluding the Five 
Civilized Tribes, only 55% spoke English, and only 37% could 
read or write the language. Based on these statistics, the 
Board supported Sells' opposition to a blanket p o l i c y . 3 1
In Sells' 1920 annual report, he supported the granting 
of citizenship to those Native Americans who served in the 
war and were honorably discharged. He believed that this 
experience had brought Indian veterans into the "civilized" 
world and they were now ready for the responsibilities of 
citizenship. Many reformers and legislators argued, though, 
that this still left large numbers without citizenship. 
Offering an opposite viewpoint, Representative Frederick W. 
Dallinger of Massachusetts, asserted that if all . Indians 
were released from federal responsibility, the Indian Bureau 
would be dissolved, thus throwing thousands of Bureau 
employees out of work, which he found totally 
u n a c c e p t a b l e .32 Between the two extreme positions, Sells 
seemed to occupy the middle ground of moderation on the 
citizenship issue.
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Richard Henry Pratt encouraged Sells to set his 
administration apart from all of the others by introducing 
dramatic measures, such as wholesale liberation, that would 
change the lives of Indians forever and break the pattern of 
the past. Unfortunately, Sells did not respond as Pratt 
would have liked and this set off a bombardment of 
opposition to Sells' hesitant p o l i c y . 33 The Society of 
American Indians led the attack on Sells and the drive for 
citizenship for all Native Americans. Charles A. Eastman 
organized lecture tours by members of the Society to spread 
the word about Indian citizenship. Eastman, a Santee Sioux, 
erupted in anger when he learned that Sells had denied his 
lecturers access to reservations for their speeches.
Eastman unfairly charged Sells with corruption and claimed 
that the Indian Bureau would not allow these Indian 
lecturers on the reservations, but would allow unscrupulous 
whites to buy and sell anything on those same reservations. 
Eastman further assailed Sells for becoming a tyrant over 
the Indian Bureau. Dennison Wheelock, of the Society of 
American Indians, agreed with Eastman, but did concede that 
perhaps some Native Americans were not ready for 
citizenship. In the end, though, Wheelock believed that the 
abusive nature of the Indian Bureau was far worse for 
Indians than if they lived in mainstream s o c i e t y . 35
As a part of Sells' paternalistic policy, an extended 
protection period of ten years would be implemented if an
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Indian was found incompetent to manage his own affairs. 
Horace J. Johnson, Superintendent of the Sac and Fox Agency 
in Oklahoma, believed that this policy was destructive to 
the lives of Native Americans. Many of the Indians who 
would receive extensions were elderly and by the time they 
were granted citizenship, they would be beyond a productive 
age, according to Johnson. He did not believe that these 
Indians were naturally lazy of idle, but rather they needed 
the opportunity to live on their o w n . 3 6
Gabe E. Parker, Superintendent in Oklahoma, noted that 
the ultimate end for Indians was citizenship. He recorded 
in 1914 that out of 304,640 Indians, only 160,311 were 
citizens, and 138,329 were not. Even before American 
involvement in World War I, Parker supported citizenship for 
all Native Americans without jeopardizing their tribal or 
property r i g h t s . 37 John Walker Harrington noted in the New 
York Times that many Indian were better prepared for 
citizenship than many immigrants. He referred to many 
Native Americans who held high government positions as 
examples. The most notable example was Oklahoma 
Representative and Chickasaw tribal member Charles D. Carter 
who had proposed legislation that would free all Indians 
from federal protection through the granting of 
citizenship. Furthermore, under Carter's bill, citizenship 
would not jeopardize tribal rights or affect existing
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property status for either tribally- or individually-owned 
lands.38
Carter's proposal met opposition from Assistant 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Edgar Merritt who accused the 
bill of decreasing or even eliminating the power of the 
Indian Bureau, which it obviously did. The Society of 
American Indians supported Carter's bill and similar 
legislative efforts, but none were passed. In 1918, a 
merger between Carter's and Arizona Senator Carl Hayden's 
bills found the wholehearted support of the Society. This 
bill included the following provisions: 1) all native-born
Indians would become citizens; 2) all tribes would draft 
final rolls for allotment of land; 3) all tribal funds would 
be divided; 4) all allotted money and land was inheritable; 
5) more money was given to those without land; 6) a three- 
person commission would be appointed by the president to 
determine competency; 7) this commission would consist of 
one Indian, one member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 
and one Indian Bureau employee; 8) this commission would 
visit each reservation for individual competency 
evaluations; 9) this commission would report to Congress 
annually, and 10) these provisions would not apply to the 
Five Civilized Tribes of O k l a h o m a . 39 Provision seven 
attracted the most support, especially from the Society of 
American Indians, because it placed a Native American in a
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position of power to help determine the future of his own 
people.
In the end, though, this legislation was defeated 
partially because of intense lobbying by Sells and the 
Indian Bureau. Sells opposed this bill because it granted 
the wholesale citizenship to Indians that he felt many could 
not handle, and it greatly diminished the power of his 
office. In early November, 1919, Congress passed 
legislation that conferred citizenship on all Native 
Americans who had served in the military during World War I 
and who had been granted an honorable discharge. The tribal 
and individual property rights of the new citizens were 
protected as well, and veterans' competency was 
automatically accepted. Congress sent this legislation to 
President Woodrow Wilson for approval, but the bill never 
received a signature. Instead, Wilson allowed the bill to 
become law without his approval by letting the time limit 
for signing run o u t . ^ 0
This one piece of legislation had two effects. First, 
reform groups, such as the Society of American Indians, were 
temporarily appeased with this partial fulfillment of their 
goals, but they soon returned to the struggle for full 
emancipation of Indians through legislative means. Finally, 
in 1924, without much debate, Congress passed an act 
declaring citizenship for all Native Americans.^  Second, 
Wilson's failure to sign the 1919 piece of legislation
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symbolized the "paternalistic" spirit of his administration. 
Citizenship for Native Americans was an official milestone 
toward the liberation of Indians. Yet, all of the problems 
that had plagued Indians for decades did not disappear with 
this legislative action. Land policy, health, and education 
remained perplexing questions for Native Americans, and 
bold, new solutions to these problems would have to await 
another decade before Commissioner John Collier undertook 
the Indian New Deal.
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CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the history of the United States, Indian 
policy has taken many different turns. In the late 
nineteenth century, reform groups such as the Indian Rights 
Association tried to assimilate "savage" Native Americans 
into the more "civilized" mainstream society. This 
organization and many religiously-affiliated groups 
introduced Christianity as a positive alternative to the 
"primitive" culture and religion of Native Americans.
Virtually all reformers believed that they knew what was 
best for Indians and they often disregarded opposing 
viewpoints from the indigenous peoples themselves. Most were 
white, middle class and well-educated men and women who lived 
on the East Coast of the United States, far removed from the 
cultures which they tried to change. Furthermore, reformers 
generally treated Indians as one entity and not the hundreds 
of unique tribes that they were. This lack of cultural 
understanding and physical distance from the cultures 
produced a myopia and often destructive policy agenda among 
these otherwise high-minded individuals and groups. However, 
reformers were caught in a contradiction. On the one hand, 
they preached about the importance of assimilating Indians 
into the mainstream culture to help bring them out of their 
"savage" ways. On the other hand, those same reformers never 
intended to treat Indians as social and political equals even 
after they were well on their way toward assimilation.4
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As the nineteenth century ended, the wars between the 
United States and Indians faded, but the hostility that 
fueled these wars remained and made complete assimilation 
quite difficult. No longer capable of waging warfare for 
their lands and lifeways, Native Americans had become wards 
of the government, and in many cases were completely 
dependent on federal officials for their livelihood. The 
1887 Dawes Severalty Act provided enabling legislation for 
the president to allot land among numerous tribes for twenty- 
five years . This land was protected by the government and 
could not be sold, leased, or taxed during this trust period. 
At the end of this time, the Indian Bureau would evaluate the 
competency of the Indian to determine whether he or she 
should be granted a title and a certificate of competency.
If determined to be competent, the Indian was free to retain 
the land or to sell it.2
Cato Sells became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1913 
during the "Progressive Era." This age was characterized by 
aggressive journalism that often uncovered scandals in 
business and government,- and by a moralism that imposed 
traditional white values upon the public. Sells was a 
dedicated "progressive," but unfortunately he entered the 
Indian Bureau with little knowledge of Indians. Although he 
had a proven administrative record in Iowa and Texas and held 
to the high moral philosophy of President Woodrow Wilson, he 
also evidenced the same ethnocentric viewpoints and moral
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certitudes as most progressives. One of Sells' first duties 
in office was to issue competency certificates to the first 
of the allotted Indians who were at the end of their twenty- 
five year trust period. The commissioner, and reform groups 
such as the Indian Rights Association and the Society of 
American Indians, advocated releasing Indians from ward 
status. Yet, while Sells took a more cautious approach, 
these reform groups wanted wholesale liberation of property 
holders from federal auspices as rapidly as possible.
For many years, the government had provided large 
amounts of money to help support Native Americans as their 
tribal land base was whittled away. Sells and most 
government leaders were looking for a way to cut back on 
government spending. They believed that if they freed 
Indians from ward status and cut off government support, this 
would accelerate Indian adjustment as full members of 
mainstream society, while simultaneously saving the 
government money. During Sells' term in office he released 
thousands of Indians from their protected status, which gave 
them the freedom that many reform groups advocated, but also 
destroyed the Indian land base very quickly. Many Indians, 
facing a new tax burden on the land and a lack of credit 
opportunities, quickly sold their property to white 
developers for less than it was worth, and wound up even more 
dependent than they previously had been.
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Sells followed the progressive philosophy and believed 
that he knew how to administer Indian affairs, when in 
reality he gained his position as a political appointment and 
knew little about how simultaneously to accomodate hundreds 
of different cultures. In agreement with the Americanization 
theories of his day, he encouraged Indians to abandon their 
tribal affiliations and become part of the great national 
melting pot. He did not treat each of the tribes as a 
different cultural unit, but rather he took steps to try and 
homogenize their different qualities. As he left office in 
1921, Sells had made some successful strides in the areas of 
education and health, but he had failed to clean up the 
corruption that plagued his Bureau. He also failed to 
resolve the multitude of disputes over land and to stem the 
tide of further losses of tribal and private lands. Many of 
these issue would not receive proper consideration until a 
dozen years later with John Collier.
John Collier became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 
April of 1933, just a month after Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
had taken the oath as president. He entered the office when 
the country was in the midst of an economic depression, and 
yet he approached his duty with excitement and enthusiasm. 
Collier held numerous meetings with experts on Indian issues, 
including Native American leaders, and eventually reorganized 
the entire Indian Bureau. He intitiated the "Indian New
155
Deal" to mirror the national measures undertaken by 
Roosevelt.
Unlike previous commissioners, Collier believed in the 
preservation of Indian societies and tribes. He argued that 
these societies should be recognized by the government and 
given responsibility and power. The new commissioner 
asserted that the land was a vital part to the continuance of 
tribes in their traditional way, and the government should 
respect Indians' traditional land use pattern based upon the 
group rather than the individual. Collier asked that all 
freedoms of the United States be guaranteed for Native 
Americans and that they be given a greater role in managing 
their own affairs in coordination with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. In order to ensure long-lasting freedom for all 
Native Americans, Collier promoted the idea of extending 
credit for Indian investment, as well as reorganizing the 
entire Indian educational system to fit new realities.^
From the late nineteenth century through World War II, 
Indian policy in the United States drastically changed. It 
began with the reform organizations trying to impose their 
values on Indian cultures out of a one-sided missionary zeal. 
That spirit still existed during Sells' tenure, but the 
financial concerns of the Bureau, the president and congress 
superseded the needs and concerns for the welfare of Native 
Americans. Sells' administration can be viewed as a 
transition from the assimilationist ideal to the multi-
156
cultural ideal of John Collier. Sells tried to free Indians 
to become a part of mainstream society, but at the same time 
he wanted to keep Indians under Bureau protection. This 
mixed message confused government officials, as well as 
Native Americans. Despite his progressive ambitions for 
improving their lives, Sells failed to appreciably alter the 
strictures of a policy which continued to punish Indians for 
their uniqueness in American society.
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ENDNOTES
^Frederick Eugene Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign 
to Assimilate the Indians. 1880-1920 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1984), ix-xvi.
2U .S . Statutes at Large v.24, p. 287-91.
^Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father v. 2, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 940-45.
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